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Religious Courts in Secular 
Jurisdictions 
HOW JEWISH AND ISLAMIC COURTS ADAPT TO 
SOCIETAL AND LEGAL NORMS 
Rabea Benhalim† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-9/11 era, public fear about the potential 
imposition of religious law on secular countries continues to rise. 
Presumptions about what comprises religious law, and its 
incompatibility with secular laws, abound. For some individuals, 
the fear of Islamic law has led to anti-Sharia legislation1 and 
heated debates about “creeping Sharia.”2 For others, the fear is 
that Judaism, Christianity, or religion generally will carry too 
much weight in secular activities.3 In light of all these concerns, 
even those who are broadly tolerant of religious practice might 
be surprised to discover that religious laws, and Islamic law in 
particular, are adjudicated and sometimes enforced in the 
United States, England, and Israel. The enforcement of religious 
 
 † William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am 
immensely grateful for comments and feedback received from Asifa Quraishi-Landes, 
Miriam Seifter, David Schwartz, Gwendolyn Leachman, Ciro Faienza, Tasnim 
Benhalim, and Adriana Aristeiguieta. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
article, I also thank the participants in the Islamic Law session at the Annual 
Association of American Law Schools annual meeting and the participants in the Law 
and Religion in the United States, Canada, and Israel session at the Law and Society 
Association annual meeting. Any errors are mine. 
 1 “Since 2010, 201 anti-Sharia law bills have been introduced in 43 states. In 
2017 alone, 14 states introduced an anti-Sharia law bill, with Texas and Arkansas 
enacting the legislation.” Swathi Shanmugasundaram, Anti-Sharia Law Bills in the 
United States, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/
2018/02/05/anti-sharia-law-bills-united-states [https://perma.cc/7Y22-JE4D]. 
 2 Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 
66 OKLA. L. REV. 431, 431 (2014); see also CREEPING SHARIA, https://creepingsharia.word
press.com [https://perma.cc/R2VY-KPV7]. 
 3 See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Some Worry About Judicial Nominee’s Ties to a 
Religious Group, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/
amy-coney-barrett-nominee-religion.html [https://perma.cc/6TM4-RFKY] (discussing 
controversial Senate comments about whether now-Judge Amy Barrett would be able to 
separate her judging from her Catholic faith). 
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laws may seem anathema to the very principles on which those 
countries exist. 
Missing from the popular discourse is any recognition of 
the multiple and varied ways in which religious courts, 
historically and today, operate in secular jurisdictions. Israel, for 
example, has rendered Jewish and Islamic law enforceable via 
state courts since the country’s inception.4 Likewise, the United 
States and England each have longstanding religious courts 
whose decisions are enforceable via the countries’ respective 
arbitration acts.5 Yet even in academia, the study of religious 
courts in secular contexts is narrow and limited. The academic 
analysis that does exist is rarely comparative—typically 
examining religious courts only within a particular subject 
matter or jurisdiction. Moreover, normatively, this work most 
often focuses on the single question of whether secular 
governments should accommodate religious arbitration.6 
A more systematic approach is needed. Rather than 
examine how secular governments accommodate religious 
judicial bodies (RJBs), as other scholars have done,7 this article 
seeks to understand the ways in which RJBs conform to their 
secular environments. This article’s approach encompasses the 
range of RJBs operating as informal mediation bodies, arbitral 
bodies, and state courts, both in contexts where the population 
served represents a majority of the population and in contexts 
where the population served represents a minority of the 
population. By considering together entities that have elsewhere 
been considered separately, this article aims to capture and 
exemplify their common ground and relevant differences. 
 
 4 See Moussa Abou Ramadan, Notes on the Anomaly of the Shari’a Field in 
Israel, 15 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 84, 85–88 (2008); see also Zvi Triger, Freedom from Religion 
in Israel: Civil Marriages and Cohabitation of Jews Enter the Rabbinical Courts, 27 ISR. 
STUD. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012). 
 5 See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL COURTS, AND 
CHRISTIAN PANELS: RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION IN AMERICA AND THE WEST 7–10, 177–79 (2017). 
 6 See generally BROYDE, supra note 5; Michael J. Broyde et al., The Pillars of 
Successful Religious Arbitration: Models for American Islamic Arbitration Based on the 
Beth Din of America and Muslim Arbitration Tribunal Experience, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL 
& ETHNIC JUST. 33 (2014); Bilal M. Choksi, Comment, Religious Arbitration in Ontario—
Making the Case Based on the British Example of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 33 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 791 (2012); Almas Khan, The Interaction Between Sharia and 
International Law in Arbitration, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 791 (2006); Ayelet Shachar, 
Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573 (2008); Erin Sisson, The Future of Sharia Law in 
American Arbitration, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 891 (2015); Nicholas Walter, Religious 
Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501 (2012); 
Norman Doe, Britain’s Religious Courts Symposium, 13 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 354 (2011). 
 7 See generally Russell Sandberg et al., Britain’s Religious Tribunals: ‘Joint 
Governance’ in Practice, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (2013) (examining the ways in 
which Great Britain accommodates religious tribunals). 
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What emerges from this analysis is that, contrary to the 
concerns of the public discourse and past scholarship, religious 
courts that serve religious minorities tend to adapt to their 
secular surrounding, rather than the other way around. They 
accommodate, by necessity, both the desires of litigants who, 
living in democratic societies, have come to expect RJBs to 
preserve their secular civil rights, and the pressures of the 
secular courts on which they rely to enforce their decisions. 
Although the general public and politics often treat RJBs as 
alien to their secular environments,8 this article demonstrates 
that RJBs serving minority populations respond to pressures 
from the legal environment in which they operate.9 RJBs may 
strive to apply religious law by relying purely on original texts 
and traditional legal scholarship, but in practice, RJBs often 
accommodate both substantive and procedural secular norms. 
At the theoretical level, religious judicial accommodation 
bears some resemblance to two other strands of thought in public 
law and administration. From one standpoint, RJBs are engaged 
in a sort of dialogue with popular culture that echoes the 
thinking of popular constitutionalism.10 Some scholars writing 
in this vein have argued that Supreme Court decisions “on a 
politically sensitive issue” are properly viewed “as generating a 
dialogue with the political branches of government and the 
people.”11 Likewise, controversial RJB decisions, especially 
decisions that affect women’s rights, may generate a dialogue 
with the religious laity that the RJBs serve and the civil courts 
that enforce their decisions. 
The adaptations of RJBs also resonate with literature 
that depicts institutions in survival mode. Indeed, religious 
courts vary from traditional Article III courts in one important 
way: religious courts have a plausible fear of losing business. To 
be sure, government-run courts may fear backlash that can 
 
 8 See, e.g., Lorraine E. Weinrib, Ontario’s Sharia Law Debate: Law and 
Politics under the Charter, in LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 239, 250 
(Richard Moon ed., 2008) (quoting the premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, saying: 
“[t]here will be no sharia law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. 
There will be one law for all Ontarians.”). 
 9 See discussion infra Section II.D. 
 10 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5–6 (2004); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 8 (2004); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2596, 2598 (2003). 
 11 Daan Braveman, On Law and Democratic Development: Popular 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 41, 47–48 (2005). 
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erode their credibility,12 but religious courts might altogether 
cease to exist if litigants pivot to state-run courts. This suggests 
that RJBs’ practice of accommodation is therefore rooted in a 
sense of survival—the sort of “organizational maintenance” that 
public administration scholar James Wilson has described.13 
This article develops these claims by examining four 
RJBs—two Jewish and two Islamic: (1) Jewish arbitral bodies in 
the United States; (2) Islamic arbitral bodies in England; (3) the 
Rabbinical courts of Israel; and (4) the Sharia courts of Israel. 
Regarding the design of the study, the selection of these courts 
hinges on a number of factors. First, both Islamic and Jewish 
RJBs share similar legal structures, historical experiences, and 
positions within the countries in which they operate.14 Second, 
they all operate in common law jurisdictions. Third, the 
countries in which they are located all have well-established 
Jewish communities and rabbinical courts (batei din, sing. beth 
din). Fourth, these jurisdictions have sizeable Muslim 
populations with Islam as the largest minority religion in 
England and Israel, and the second largest minority religion in 
the United States. Fifth, these RJBs are well-established and 
actively issuing rulings. Finally, these RJBs all primarily deal 
with family law cases and face similar controversies regarding 
the impact of their application of religious family law on 
women’s rights. They all also deal with commercial matters, in 
which they face limited to no controversy. 
Additionally, instead of focusing only on jurisdictions 
wherein RJBs operate via arbitration or mediation,15 this article 
aims to address RJBs within the full spectrum of enforceability in 
 
 12 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, xi (2012). 
 13 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 30–51 (1973). 
 14 While Christian alternative dispute resolution (ADR) exists in the United 
States, this article almost exclusively focuses on Muslim and Jewish judicial bodies and 
excludes Christian judicial bodies. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the motivations for 
Christians to engage in Christian ADR are “based on teachings of the Bible . . . which 
encourage Christians to settle disputes in a peaceful manner,” and not as a means of 
applying religious law in lieu of secular law. BROYDE, supra note 5, at 17 (citations omitted). 
Second, within Christianity the relationship to religious law is distinctly different than 
within Judaism and Islam. Unlike Judaism and Islam, “there seem to be vast areas of 
secular law that have no direct Christian counterpart.” Id. at 18. Therefore, the motivations 
for selecting Christian ADR are best understood as selecting a particular forum rather than 
specific law. Id. Furthermore, within the Catholic Christian context, while canon law is 
“one of the most ancient and robust legal systems in the world,” it is mostly used to resolve 
“church governance issues.” Id. at 18–19. Due to accessibility and common practice, 
Catholic laity rarely use canon law and “Catholic Church ecclesiastical law has no private 
ADR mechanism to resolve disputes between private parties.” Id. at 19. 
 15 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Selby & Anna C. Korteweg, Introduction: Situating the 
Sharia Debate in Ontario, in DEBATING SHARIA: ISLAM, GENDER POLITICS, AND FAMILY 
LAW ARBITRATION 12 (Anna C. Korteweg & Jennifer A. Selby eds., 2012). 
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which they operate. Prior works have only comparatively 
examined religious arbitral bodies that serve minority 
populations and addressed whether secular legal systems should 
accommodate religious minorities. This article includes the 
Rabbinical courts of Israel as a means of examining differences in 
RJB behavior when serving a majority population versus a 
minority population. Review of this full spectrum will help 
illustrate the conclusion that the secular environment—including 
the enforceability and exclusivity of subject matter jurisdiction—
in which RJBs operate influences their procedure and judgments. 
Part I of this article offers a primer on the jurisdiction 
and origins of RJBs in Israel, the United States, and England. It 
then synthesizes prior scholarship on RJBs and notes the public 
controversies that prompted that work. Part II explores the 
environmental milieu of historical, political, legal, and social 
factors in which these judicial bodies operate. Part III 
examines—through case law, rules of procedure, and anecdotal 
case studies—the environmental impact on the degree to which 
RJBs accommodate secular procedural and substantive norms. 
It concludes with a broader view of the implications of this study 
and suggests directions that future research might take. 
I. UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS JUDICIAL BODIES 
Understanding why and how RJBs accommodate secular 
norms requires basic background knowledge of the origins, 
jurisdiction, and guiding laws of RJBs, as well as knowledge of 
the controversies and scholarship RJBs have sparked. The 
majority of the existing literature focuses on whether secular, 
democratic nations should continue to foster legal pluralism that 
includes religious judicial options. 
Israel, the United States, and England all have long 
histories of promoting legal pluralism that includes religious 
judicial options. The Israeli Rabbinical and Sharia courts have 
operated since the founding of the state, and indeed, even pre-
date its creation, originating in the Ottoman Empire.16 Jewish 
RJBs in the United States began with pre-World War I Kehillah 
tribunals and have continued to develop into the robust 
arbitration bodies that are active today.17 Islamic RJBs in the 
United States remain in their infancy. Within England, the 
London Beth Din dates back to the early 1700s and remains 
 
 16 See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 85–88; see also Triger, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 17 See Walter, supra note 6, at 514. 
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active today.18 England has also witnessed the development of 
British Islamic RJBs with the growth of England’s Muslim 
population.19 Jews and Muslims continue to seek alternatives to 
the civil judicial system in order to resolve disputes according to 
their respective religious laws.20 The roots these judicial bodies 
have in their respective environments and the depth of these 
roots are key factors in understanding how RJBs operate within 
the larger judicial system and how it affects them. 
A. Primer on RJBs 
Jewish arbitration bodies in the United States, Islamic 
arbitration bodies in England, the Sharia courts of Israel, and 
the Rabbinical courts of Israel represent the spectrum of the 
RJBs that exist in secular contexts. The Rabbinical and Sharia 
courts of Israel occupy one end of the spectrum. These state-run 
courts hold exclusive jurisdiction in many areas of family law.21 
Islamic RJBs in England occupy the other end of the spectrum. 
Due to limitations within English arbitration law, these 
religious bodies tend to operate as informal mediation panels 
with some enforceable arbitration for commercial matters.22 
Jewish RJBs in the United States fall in the middle of this 
spectrum with more robust RJBs that operate both as informal 
mediation and, due to flexibility within American arbitration 
law, more often as formal, enforceable arbitration. This 
spectrum is best understood in the context of the historical 
origin, jurisdiction, and guiding laws of each RJB. 
This article will use the Israeli Rabbinical courts as the 
sole case study of a religious court in a secular society that serves 
the majority of the population. All the other courts examined 
serve a minority population in their respective countries. Israel’s 
Sharia courts will be the sole example of a minority court that 
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction in some matters. The other two case 
studies, Islamic RJBs in England and Jewish RJBs the United 
States, both differ from Israel’s religious courts in that they 
operate independently of the state via arbitration. In Israel, the 
Sharia and Rabbinical courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in 
 
 18 About the London Beth Din, THEUS, https://www.theus.org.uk/article/about-
london-beth-din [https://perma.cc/23ZY-87JH]. 
 19 See BROYDE, supra note 5, at 177–78. 
 20 See Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer 
to Beth Din Arbitration and the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 
635 (2004) (describing the “Talmudic ban on Jews voluntarily presenting their cases to 
courts governed by idolatrous people[ ] .”) 
 21 See Triger, supra note 4, at 6. 
 22 See Broyde et al., supra note 6, at 36–37. 
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some matters of family law.23 Conversely, in the United States 
and England, litigants go before these RJBs only when they have 
elected to use religious arbitration/mediation because there is no 
jurisdictional exclusivity to compel them otherwise. 
1. The Jewish and Islamic RJBs in Israel 
The Rabbinical courts and Sharia courts in Israel share 
the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, a fact which 
explains their contemporary relationship to the state. Under the 
Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim religious communities were 
granted significant autonomy, including their own independent 
legal systems.24 The legal independence of minority religious 
communities is known as the Millet System, wherein minority 
courts operated independently of the state-operated Sharia 
courts.25 With the creation of the State of Israel, aspects of the 
Millet System, such as the concept of separate religious courts 
for the different religious communities, were maintained.26 
Today, the Rabbinical and Sharia courts of Israel enjoy 
exclusive jurisdiction in some areas of personal status law and 
concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts in others.27 This 
jurisdictional focus on family law also reflects the influence of 
the late-Ottoman Empire. The historical legacy reaches into the 
present and extends beyond the mere existence of religious 
courts into the very laws they enforce. 
With present-day Israeli Sharia courts, the following 
laws are derived from Ottoman codes: the Majalla (1876), the 
Ottoman Law of Family Rights (OLFR) (1917), and the Law of 
Procedure for Sharia Courts (1917). Ido Shahar explains why 
Ottoman law remains the law for Muslims in Israel today: 
Since the Israeli legislature has generally refrained from intervening 
in the material religious laws . . . and since there is no Council of 
Muslim Jurists (majlis ifta’) in Israel, nor any other legitimate 
Muslim body of legislation, the Ottoman codes have remained in force 
in shari’a courts until this very day.28 
While these codes remain in place, they have been limited via 
civil family laws. The focus of these civil laws is the promotion 
 
 23 See Triger, supra note 4, at 6. 
 24 IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (1975). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Aharon Layish, Adaptation of a Jurists’ Law to Modern Times in an Alien 
Environment: The Case of the Shari’a in Israel, 46 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 168, 170 n.11 (2006). 
 27 See Ramadan, supra note 4, at 99–100. 
 28 IDO SHAHAR, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE HOLY CITY: COMPETING COURTS, 
FORUM SHOPPING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN JERUSALEM 34 (2016). 
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of gender equality. While the laws apply to civil and religious 
courts, the legislature did not intend for them “to affect the 
jurisdiction of the religious courts.”29 
Until 2001, the Sharia courts in Israel enjoyed the 
broadest jurisdiction of any of the religious courts.30 The Sharia 
courts “were accorded exclusive jurisdiction in all matters of 
personal status . . . while the other courts were accorded 
exclusive jurisdiction in some matters, and concurrent 
jurisdiction in others.”31 In 2001, however, the Knesset32 granted 
civil family courts “concurrent jurisdiction over Muslim 
litigants, similar to the jurisdiction they had already with regard 
to litigants belonging to other religious communities.”33 
Surprisingly, the Rabbinical courts have had more limited 
jurisdiction for much of Israeli history. This first limitation on the 
Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction originated prior to the creation of 
the State of Israel, during the Mandate period.34 Under the 
Ottoman Empire, the Rabbinical courts “had exclusive 
jurisdiction over all matters of personal jurisdiction within the 
Jewish community.”35 The British Mandatory Authority limited 
the Rabbinical courts’ exclusive jurisdiction “to matters of divorce, 
alimony, and the confirmation of wills” and allowed for concurrent 
jurisdiction with civil courts for other matters of personal status, 
including “maintenance, guardianship, legitimation, and 
adoption of minors, succession, incompetency, etc.”36 
In the 1950s, the Knesset “passed a series of laws which 
modified the jurisdiction, structure, and even some norms of the 
Rabbinical Courts,” such that they only possess exclusive 
jurisdiction in marriage and divorce and additionally have 
concurrent jurisdiction in the confirmation of wills.37 During this 
period, Rabbinical court judges “became state officials akin to 
the judges of the civil courts and with equivalent salaries.”38 
Despite shifts in their exclusive and concurrent 
jurisdiction, the Rabbinical courts have maintained exclusive 
control over the interpretation of the Jewish law applied in their 
courtrooms. Although Conservative, Reform, and Liberal 
Judaism exist in Israel, the Rabbinical courts exclusively apply 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 37. 
 31 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 32 Ramadan, supra note 4, at 87 (the Knesset is the name for Israel’s parliament). 
 33 SHAHAR, supra note 28, at 37 n.24. 
 34 MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 52 (1994). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 52–53. 
 38 Id. at 53. 
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Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.39 The preservation of 
Orthodox Judaism in the courts predates the creation of the 
state from an agreement, which “set the parameters of what is 
known in Israel today as the religious status quo.”40 Under the 
“status quo agreement,” the Rabbinical courts maintain 
jurisdiction over matters of personal status for all Jews, 
regardless of their individual adherence to Judaism.41 
2. The Islamic RJBs in England 
Islamic RJBs in England emerged out of a meeting in 
1982 of Islamic scholars in Birmingham.42 Their intention had 
been to create a “new Britain-wide shariʿa council” that would 
address “a wide range of religious issues, from banking and 
mortgages to standards for halal food.”43 One founding scholar, 
Suhaib Hasan, later reflected that:  
We intended that the council provide decisions for the Muslim 
community on any and all matters, but pretty soon it became clear to 
us that we were spending all our time giving women divorces. This 
was not what we set out to do, but there was a vacuum in the 
community, and we filled it.44 
Because of issues regarding women’s rights, these RJBs have 
become controversial in England. The press45 and politicians46 
have often mischaracterized the jurisdiction of Islamic RJBs in 
England as allowing for “legally binding” Islamic Sharia courts 
for all matters. In reality, under the Arbitration Act of 1996, only 
some religious disputes of a commercial nature “may be resolved 
through binding arbitration” under the Act.47 Binding 
 
 39 See id. at 51. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 JOHN R. BOWEN, ON BRITISH ISLAM: RELIGION, LAW, AND EVERYDAY 
PRACTICE IN SHARI’A COUNCILS 47 (2016). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See John Bingham, Sharia Courts ‘as Consensual as Rape,’ House of Lords 
Told, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9621319/
Sharia-courts-as-consensual-as-rape-House-of-Lords-told.html [https://perma.cc/DN8H-
M447]; Matthew Hickley, Islamic Sharia Courts in Britain are now ‘Legally Binding’, 
DAILY MAIL (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1055764/Islamic-
sharia-courts-Britain-legally-binding.html [https://perma.cc/Q5KQ-W2PJ]. 
 46 See Frank Cranmer, Sharia law, the Arbitration Act 1996 and the 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill, LAW & RELIGION UK (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2012/10/24/sharia-law-the-arbitration-act-1996-and-
the-arbitration-and-mediation-services-equality-bill [https://perma.cc/GJX9-AWHC]. 
 47 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 155; Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23 (UK), http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/contents [https://perma.cc/R4RQ-GA6P]. 
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enforceability requires that a “proper contract is drawn up in the 
presence of a lawyer and freely agreed to by the parties.”48 
Similar to the situation in the United States, the 
Arbitration Act “limits the conditions under which either party 
may appeal,” such that “appeals are allowed on grounds that the 
procedures followed were unfair or misleading.”49 Also like the 
United States, the Act does not prohibit “a religious body from 
supervising such an arbitration procedure . . . as long as proper 
contractual procedures are followed.”50 
While the Arbitration Act clearly allows for religious 
arbitration of commercial matters, it is less clear regarding 
family law. The act “prohibits arbitration of all except civil law 
matters. This excludes all family law as well as criminal 
disputes.”51 Prior to 2012, divorced couples were prevented “from 
submitting financial matters to binding arbitration because 
doing so would ‘fetter’ the court.”52 
Shifts to the law in 2012 now indicate that judges may 
rule that “the arbitration of financial and property disputes for 
divorcing couples” is permitted under the act.53 A 2012 proposal 
from the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators (IFLA) has been 
“met with approval from some key judges.”54 The proposal might 
allow arbitration of some family law matters within religious 
courts (in the form of financial and property disputes), although 
the proposal “stipulates that the arbitrator may only decide the 
dispute in accord with the law of England and Wales, that is, not 
elements of Islamic law, Jewish law, or foreign law.”55 
As a result, disputes before Islamic RJBs in England most 
often take the form of mediation or non-binding arbitration, as 
the majority of disputes before it are divorce cases.56 The most 
prominent of these courts is the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
(MAT), which “provides a network of relatively formal and 
transparent arbitral tribunals for British Muslims.”57 Other 
 
 48 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 155. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Sisson, supra note 6, at 892–93. 
 52 Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, c. 18 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1973/18 [https://perma.cc/D86Q-WF7S]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 BOWEN, supra note 42, at 177. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Services: How Does the Islamic Sharia Council Work?, ISLAMIC SHARIA 
COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/services [https://perma.cc/YJW5-XTKY] (“80% 
of all letters received by the Council are related to matrimonial problems faced by 
Muslims in the UK. The remaining are related to people asking for Islamic injunctions 
(fatawa) pertaining to their daily lives. Matters of dispute amongst Muslim groups have 
been also referred to the Council for resolution.”). 
 57 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 187. 
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courts, such as the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC)58 and the Muslim 
Law Sharia Council, “operate outside the British arbitration 
framework” and issue unenforceable decisions.59 
The MAT differentiates itself from the sharia councils by, 
in addition to marital mediation, also offering commercial 
arbitration. It has focused its efforts on “offer[ing] the Muslim 
community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in 
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that 
the outcome as determined by MAT will be binding and 
enforceable.”60 “The . . . MAT was established in 2007 to provide 
British Muslims with a more effective alternative for resolving 
disputes in accordance with Islamic law . . . .”61 Due to the MAT’s 
popularity and focus on enforceability, it serves as a case study 
in understanding how and why Islamic RJBs “settle disputes in 
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law” in such a way that is also 
enforceable under the Arbitration Act of 1996.62 
3. The Jewish RJBs in the United States 
The legal situation of religious courts in the United 
States is similarly situated to those in England with a few 
important differences. Arbitration existed during America’s 
colonial period and was widely used by Christian communities.63 
In the post-Revolutionary era, religious arbitration lost its 
general popularity among Christians with a number of notable 
exceptions within certain religious communities, including 
Utopian and Mormon communities.64 The American Jewish 
community is perhaps the most well-known religious community 
in the United States to utilize religious arbitration.65 
One of the foremost RJBs in the United States is the Beth 
Din of America (BDA). It was developed in 1960 “to provide a more 
effective adjudicative forum for Jews committed to living in 
 
 58 See About Us, ISLAMIC SHARIA COUNCIL, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/aboutus/ 
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judgments to be sound.” BOWEN, supra note 42, at 85. 
 60 About Us: Why MAT?, MUSLIM ARB. TRIBUNAL, http://www.matribunal.com/
why-MAT.php [https://perma.cc/N6C7-WZ7Y]. 
 61 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 177. 
 62 About Us: Why MAT?, supra note 60. 
 63 Walter, supra note 6, at 510–11. 
 64 Id. at 512–13. 
 65 See Broyde et al., supra note 6, at 36. 
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accordance with halakha [Jewish law] in a secular American legal 
and social context.”66 It has gone through several iterations and 
in its current iteration, “provides a sprawling network of Jewish 
law courts that function as fully legal, halakha-compliant 
arbitration panels” that offer observant Jewish litigants access to 
a religious law-compliant adjudicatory forum marked by the 
characteristic expedience and affordability of arbitration.67 
The BDA has achieved this via the adoption of “a host of 
prudent measures designed to improve the transparency, 
consistency, equity, and professionalism of its arbitral process,” 
and in doing so, “has gained widespread acceptance among 
America’s secular courts, which are comfortable enforcing its 
arbitral decisions, and which to date have never overturned a 
BDA-issued arbitration award.”68 While the BDA handles many 
marital matters, it also arbitrates in commercial matters.69 Due 
to its well-known success, the MAT modeled itself on the BDA.70 
The BDA utilizes the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to 
enforce its decisions.71 U.S. arbitration law is “strongly grounded in 
contract theories” and courts generally hold that “[p]arties’ 
decisions to arbitrate private disputes should be upheld in order to 
promote and respect the contractual autonomy and freedom of 
private parties to order their private affairs in whatever way seems 
best to them.”72 As a result, sophisticated religious arbitration has 
developed for both commercial and marital matters. 
The FAA does not have the same limitations on family law 
arbitration as the United Kingdom’s Arbitration Act of 1996.73 
While divorce must go through the civil courts, parties may agree 
via contract to arbitrate aspects of their divorce (although some 
limitations exist in state law).74 Unlike England, in many 
instances, parties may arbitrate such matters as property 
 
 66 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 138 (emphasis in original). 
 67 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by 
Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379, 
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 71 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); Amy S. Fancher, 
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Are They Kosher?, 24 REGENT U.L. REV. 459, 473–77 (2012). 
 72 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 95–96. 
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1996/23/contents [https://perma.cc/R4RQ-GA6P]. 
 74 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 132 (citing AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 665 
(2016)) (discussing how some states maintain exclusive control over some areas of family 
law, including child support and custody, despite contractual agreements to arbitrate.). 
2019] RELIGIOUS COURTS IN SECULAR JURISDICTIONS 757 
distribution, alimony, child support, and custody agreements.75 
Like the MAT, it deals with divorce and commercial cases.76 
Due to political and cultural realities regarding Islamic 
law in American society, Islamic binding arbitration has yet to 
develop in the United States as it has in England. Some non-
binding mediation and arbitration has developed in the United 
States but remains limited to serving the North Texas Muslim 
community.77 While the Jewish and Muslim communities in the 
United States share similar characteristics in terms of size and 
the role of religious law in their faiths, Jewish courts are much 
better established.78 Therefore, the BDA is used as a case study 
for understanding how and why Jewish courts in the United 
States accommodate secular justice norms. 
B. Past Controversies 
Understanding why RJBs make adaptations and 
accommodations in secular contexts challenges the alarm and 
assumptions about Islamic law raised by politicians and the 
general populace. A series of controversies in Canada and the 
United Kingdom in the last decade has prompted the majority of 
the scholarship on RJBs. These controversies reflect rising 
tensions around the question of the role of religious law in 
secular countries. Such alarm flared following proposals to 
accommodate religious arbitration in Canada and the U.K.79 The 
general perception of RJBs, especially Islamic courts, exhibits 
an understanding of religious law that is antiquated at best and 
dangerous at worst. Critics of RJBs often focus on Islamic law 
and reduce it to the subset of criminal laws that detail corporal 
punishment (hudud laws).80 The prevailing assumption about 
Islamic law is that it “is a uniform thing, a fixed, unchangeable 
 
 75 Id. at 131–32. 
 76 Id. at 138. 
 77 See Our Mission, ISLAMIC TRIBUNAL, https://www.islamictribunal.org/our-
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 79 See Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 22 (“The resulting public debate did 
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 80 See Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 19 (describing reactions during the 
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set of norms that is binding upon all Muslims.”81 Two events in 
recent memory reflect these commonly held beliefs. Both have 
triggered scholarship on the topic. 
The first event was a lengthy international debate, which 
occurred in Ontario, Canada from 2004 to 2005.82 It arose when 
the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) announced in 2003 
that it “would begin offering arbitration services in family 
disputes in accordance with established Islamic law and the 
province of Ontario’s 1991 Arbitration Act.”83 Although Jewish 
and Christian groups had previously used Ontario’s 1991 
Arbitration Act to “set up alternate dispute resolution boards 
that arbitrated in accordance with their religious principles,” 
these RJBs did not trigger a state of alarm.84 Conversely, the 
IICJ’s announcement that they would establish an Islamic 
arbitral body, which “paralleled Jewish arbitration practices,” 
resulted in a massive debate.85 
In June 2004, in response to the public outcry and debate, 
Michael Bryant, the former Attorney General, and Sandra 
Pupatello, the Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, appointed 
former Attorney General Marion Boyd “to conduct a formal review 
of the use of arbitration in family and inheritance law in the 
province.”86 In December 2004, Boyd published her report with a 
set of extensive recommendations and “concluded that binding 
religious arbitration of family law issues based on ‘Islamic legal 
principles’ was permissible according to the Arbitration Act.”87 
Boyd’s recommendations called for greater oversight of 
religious arbitration both prior to and post arbitration. Boyd’s 
recommendations included: (1) screening of arbitration parties, 
prior to arbitration, in order to determine whether any “issues of 
power imbalance” exist and to “ensure that both parties are 
agreeing voluntarily to arbitration and understand the nature 
and consequences of entering into the process”88; and (2) civil court 
judicial review of arbitration awards that would require the court 
to set aside arbitration awards that do not meet an established 
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 83 Selby & Korteweg, supra note 15, at 12. 
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set of requirements designed to protect civil rights.89 Had these 
recommendations been implemented, they would have resulted in 
a much higher degree of substantive review of religious 
arbitration. Boyd’s report, however, was not enough to squelch 
the swell of panic the IICJ’s initial announcement created. 
The movement against Islamic arbitration in Ontario 
included “prominent women’s organizations such as the pro-faith 
Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) and the secular 
International Campaign against Shariah Courts.”90 Of particular 
concern was that women would be unequal under Islamic law, 
especially with regard to divorce.91 By the summer of 2005, 
international opposition to Islamic faith-based arbitration resulted 
in “eighty-seven human rights groups” opposing the Ontario plan.92 
Most of this opposition “did not reflect how ordinary Sharia is in 
the everyday lives of many Canadian Muslims, but instead 
portrayed it as alien within a liberal democratic context.”93 Despite 
Boyd’s recommendations, as well as support from prominent 
scholars, the outcry resulted in amendments to the Arbitration Act 
that banned religious arbitration.94 
A similar phenomenon occurred in in the U.K. in 2008 
when then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, gave a 
speech “explor[ing] ways in which the legal system might 
‘recognise shari’a,’” observing that such recognition would entail 
“access to recognised authority acting for a religious group.”95 
His speech led to fierce opposition to the perceived imposition of 
Islamic law, with headlines declaring that “Islamic sharia courts 
in Britain are now ‘legally binding’” and “Sharia courts as 
‘consensual as rape.’”96 
C. Prior Scholarship 
Most scholars of religious law who pay attention to RJBs 
focus on the normative question of whether RJBs have a role to 
play in secular jurisdictions.97 Scholarship is mostly divided 
between those in favor of religious legal pluralism, arguing that 
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RJBs promote religious liberty and social integration,98 and those 
in favor of “one law for all,” arguing RJBs undermine civil liberties 
and civil integration.99 These scholars can all be broadly 
understood as working within the field of legal pluralism. As 
other scholars examining religious courts have found, “the 
insights of legal pluralism are most useful” in understanding the 
complexity of the courts, their application of religious law, and 
their interaction with civil law.100 
Professor Ayelet Shachar’s work, Multicultural 
Jurisdictions,101 is the seminal work in this area. Scholars102 and 
activists103 have especially built on her theories regarding how 
governments can best accommodate cultural and religious 
differences, while preserving women’s rights.104 Shachar 
provides support for arguments in favor of “expanding the 
jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities,” but 
also “offer[ing] hardnosed and practical legal-institutional 
solutions to the problem of sanctioned in-group rights 
violations.”105 In particular, academic literature has focused on 
Shachar’s theory of “transformative accommodation.”106 
According to the former Archbishop of Canterbury, this theory 
provides “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to 
choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to resolve 
certain carefully specified matters,” while concurrently ensuring 
the protection of civil rights.107 
On the other side of the debate are those scholars108 and 
activists who advocate for “One Law for All” and the eradication of 
RJBs.109 This literature is primarily motivated by concerns  
 98 See, e.g., BROYDE, supra note 5, at 237–38, 259.  
 99 Emon, supra note 82, at 420. 
 100 See, e.g., Pascale Fournier et al., Secular Rights and Religious Wrongs? Family 
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regarding applications of Islamic law that may violate civil rights 
and suggests that the best way to ensure equal rights for all 
citizens is to ban the application of religious law. For instance, 
Professor Elham Manea falls decidedly among those scholars who 
oppose the introduction of RJBs in secular contexts.110 She criticizes 
religious legal pluralism advocates for viewing Islamic law as an 
“expression of the universal principles of Islam,” and not as 
“concrete religious laws and rules . . . which can violate human 
dignity and human rights,” as can be seen in countries such as 
“Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Afghanistan . . . .”111 Authors such 
as Manea do not consider the societal context surrounding Islamic 
RJBs and how that context influences RJBs’ interpretation of 
religious law and religious litigants’ perspectives.112 
Other scholars have documented how enforcement and 
interpretation of Islamic law differs in varying societal contexts, 
noting distinct differences in places like Saudi Arabia, which has 
highly puritanical interpretations, and Indonesia, which has 
“moderate, contemporary interpretations.”113 Societal context 
also plays an important role in terms of the expectations and 
desires religious people living in secular society have about 
religious law. Surveys of Muslims living in Europe and the 
United States find that “Muslims are quite satisfied with the 
secular nature of European political regimes,” and that “they 
engage in politics and the democratic process, utilizing 
mainstream parties and institutions.”114 However, this “does not 
mean that [Muslims] renounce Islamic principles and legal rules 
to guide or structure their daily lives.”115 
According to Professor Julie Macfarlane, Muslims’ desire 
to utilize RJBs does not necessarily reflect either a particularly 
high degree of religiosity or the desire for Islamic law to replace 
or supersede secular law.116 In interviews with imams in the 
United States and Canada, she found many of the Muslims who 
came to the imams for a divorce did not “practice Islam in a 
traditionally observant fashion.”117 The imams understood that 
these individuals were “looking for affirmation or an absolution 
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that they . . . followed the ‘right’ course Islamically.”118 These 
imams observed that “[e]ven if they are [otherwise] secular 
[Muslims], they don’t want to mess with sensitive family 
issues . . . they want to do it right.”119 Macfarlane further found 
that respondents tended to marry and divorce according to both 
civil and Islamic law and did “not want a set of parallel courts 
for Islamic law” that would replace civil options.120 
These three broad groups in the contemporary 
scholarship—pro-multiculturalism, One Law for All, and 
contextual studies of RJBs—have all made important 
contributions, yet even taken together they leave key areas 
unexplored. The first two, focused as they are on the question of 
whether secular governments need to accommodate religious 
RJBs, are limited by their choice to adopt the perspective of 
secular governments. As a result, their arguments make little to 
no consideration of whether, how, and why RJBs adapt 
themselves to secular environments. 
Even the aforementioned contextual studies cannot 
capture the entire picture. While scholars like Manea cite Saudi 
Arabian and Iranian RJBs to determine how RJBs would likely 
act in secular contexts,121 the reality is that Islamic law within 
the secular context takes on a wide variety of interpretations 
and accommodations. Muslims living in secular countries are 
“debating how they should relate to their tradition, what social 
and gender norms they should adopt, and how they should deal 
with the question of integration.”122 This debate is very much one 
still in progress as Muslims continue to develop specific legal 
interpretations for living as minorities in non-Muslim majority 
countries (fiqh al-aqalliyyat).123 
To date, a single monograph has looked more 
systematically at RJBs. Professor Michael Broyde, in his book, 
Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinical Courts, and Christian Panels, 
focuses on the Jewish experience in the United States and the 
Muslim experience in England.124 In his book, Broyde “explains 
why religious communities and individuals are increasingly 
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turning to private, faith-based dispute resolution” and “explain[s] 
how it is that American law came to permit litigants to opt-out of 
secular law and instead choose to resolve their disputes through 
faith-based arbitration.”125 He identifies how faith-based 
arbitration, especially the BDA, has developed in America and 
England to meet the procedural justice norms of secular law.126 
Yet this work, while significant, focuses solely on 
arbitration bodies and does not focus on litigants’ influence on 
RJBs. This last point is significant, as scholars have called for a 
shift in legal pluralism studies to a focus on legal subjects 
instead of the state, what they term “critical legal pluralism.”127 
Critical legal pluralism “embraces a philosophical commitment 
to the subjective construction of law by legal subjects.”128 The law 
within critical legal pluralism “encompass[es] ‘how legal 
subjects understand themselves and the law.’ For critical legal 
pluralists, ‘law arises from, belongs to, and responds to 
everyone.’”129 Religious laity (subjects of religious law) living in 
secular settings develop expectations of religious law based on 
the legal norms of the country in which they live. Accordingly, 
religious courts tend to interpret religious law in ways that lend 
themselves to these expectations.130 
For critical legal pluralists, religious laity “shape and 
produce law as much” as judges and mediators on religious 
courts.131 According to Professors Martha-Marie Klienhans and 
Roderick Macdonald, the flag-bearers of critical legal pluralism: 
“Legal subjects . . . possess a transformative capacity that 
enables them to produce legal knowledge and to fashion the very 
structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal 
subjectivity.”132 This methodology identifies religious people who 
use RJBs as social and political agents who influence the 
interpretations and development of religious law. 
While religious laity act as agents in the development 
and interpretation of religious law in a secular state, the state 
still plays an important role in this socio-legal inquiry.133 
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Specifically, the state still plays an important role on religious 
courts’ conformity to secular procedural and social justice norms, 
as RJBs rely on the state to maintain their jurisdiction and 
enforce their judgments. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF RJBS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
LIMITED JURISDICTION 
The difference between RJBs that serve minority 
populations and RJBs that serve majority populations in their 
accommodation of secular norms hinges on four factors. These 
four factors are: (1) the historical narrowing of their jurisdiction; 
(2) the political environments that threaten their continued 
existence; (3) civil courts’ judicial oversight of RJBs and RJBs’ 
reliance on civil courts to enforce decisions; and (4) the 
expectations of litigants that RJBs uphold their civil rights, 
especially as regards women’s rights. The influence of litigants’ 
expectations on RJB behavior finds some support in popular 
constitutionalism.134 Likewise, possible explanations for the 
motivations of RJBs to accommodate secular norms also finds 
some resonance in James Wilson’s explanations of political 
organization behavior.135 
A. Historical Development 
The RJBs examined herein all emerge out of a historical 
environment wherein RJBs were prominent—and in some 
instances the exclusive—judicial bodies. The influence of the 
Enlightenment led to a curtailment of the jurisdiction and 
specific form of RJBs.136 Yet, the Enlightenment ideals in each 
country also led to a valuing of religious and legal pluralism. As 
detailed below, the RJBs have all undergone a narrowing of their 
jurisdiction and now rely on a secular state to enforce their 
decisions. The historical evolution of the RJBs has led to current 
political and social implications. RJBs now exist in a political 
environment wherein secularism dominates, resulting in 
increased questioning of whether RJBs ought to exist. 
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1. Evolution of Islamic and Jewish RJBs in Israel 
For both the Sharia courts and the Rabbinical courts in 
Israel, tensions exist between the religious courts and the secular 
laws and courts of the state. Here, the question of judicial reform 
and activism has often gone hand in hand with questions of 
jurisdiction, which have themselves originated out of the tension 
between the concurrent existence of religious courts and secular 
courts and laws. This tension, however, did not begin with the 
creation of the State of Israel. The tension can be traced as far 
back as the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the 
concurrent immigration of European Jews into Ottoman 
territory, when a narrowing of Ottoman religious courts’ 
jurisdiction began. During the Tanzimat period, spanning the late 
18th century up to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, “the 
sultans enacted a series of governmental, administrative and 
legal reforms which” can be understood as an attempt to 
“transition to modernity.”137 The Ottoman Empire’s “transition to 
modernity,” which was driven by the Enlightenment in Europe 
and competition with Europe, primarily took the form of 
secularization of governmental and legal structures.138 
Pre-Tanzimat, minority subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
were permitted to, and did, operate their own religious courts in 
which they had jurisdiction over almost all matters, including 
commercial matters and taxation (with the exception of “capital 
crimes and issues pertaining to religious endowments”).139 The 
Sharia courts handled all matters but also began to see their 
jurisdiction limited during the Tanzimat era.140 
The Tanzimat reforms in particular are understood as 
the period that shifted the “historical balance between ‘secular’ 
law and [religious law].”141 These reforms included the 
codification of law (as described earlier, some of which remain 
enforced in Israel today), including family law, and the creation 
of secular, civil courts, which functioned parallel to the Sharia 
courts.142 This led to an erosion of the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction, 
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such that the Sharia courts eventually only retained jurisdiction 
over “matters relating to personal status.”143 This erosion led to 
a weakening of the power of qadis (Sharia court judges).144 
The Tanzimat reforms also increased secularization of 
the Jewish community by significantly reducing the jurisdiction 
of their Rabbinical courts (operating autonomously under the 
millet system) down to only “marital and inheritance issues,”145 
a drastic change from the broad jurisdiction they previously 
enjoyed over almost all subject matters. This contributed to a 
decline in the authority and utilization of the Jewish 
community’s Rabbinical courts in various regions of the 
empire.146 This implementation not only ultimately “reduced the 
competence of the Jewish courts” but also diminished the power 
and authority of local religious leadership.147 
The transformation of the Rabbinical courts resulted 
from several societal factors besides the Tanzimat reforms 
themselves. For instance, many Ashkenazi immigrants of the 
time viewed the Ottoman Empire as a safe haven from the vast 
Enlightenment reforms occurring in their home countries and 
immigrated to Ottoman territories in order to carve out enclaves 
of Orthodoxy.148 The Ashkenazi Orthodox response to the 
perceived threat of the Haskalah (the European Jewish 
Enlightenment reform movement) “manifested itself in the 
adoption of stringent positions on a wide range of aspects of 
modern life . . . and a controlled, begrudging accommodation 
with the changing realities.”149 For instance, in Jerusalem a 
controversy emerged between the European Jewish 
communities. Eastern European Jews, predominately Russian, 
opposed an attempt to open a modern school. Their opposition 
was based, at least in part, on “the struggle of traditional East 
European Jewry against the establishment of government 
schools . . . ”150 They viewed themselves “as part of a worldwide 
front defended by the Orthodox, those faithful to Jewish 
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values.”151 They viewed Palestine as the “last stronghold of 
traditional society still unsullied by the pernicious influence of 
European Haskalah in all its manifestation.”152 While this 
struggle emerged in the Ottoman period, it has had long-lasting 
effects on the Orthodox Jewish control of the Rabbinical courts, 
as further described below.153 
By the time Palestine fell under the British Mandate 
both the Sharia and Rabbinical courts had their previously 
almost unlimited jurisdictions narrowed to the area of personal 
status law, although they had exclusive jurisdiction in these 
matters.154 In addition to the significant changes to the 
Rabbinical and Sharia courts, related to changes in sovereignty, 
the British Mandate authorities introduced a number of 
structural changes that have impacted the courts’ contemporary 
rulings. In particular, as part of an endeavor to align the 
procedural norms of the religious courts to those of English law, 
the Mandate authorities introduced courts of appeals into the 
Rabbinical and Sharia courts.155 Neither Islamic Law nor 
Halakha (Jewish Law) formerly had conceptualized such a 
construction.156 As will be further explored below, these courts of 
appeals have played a major role in the reform of the Sharia 
courts in the modern period.157 
The creation of the State of Israel significantly affected 
the relationship of both the Sharia and Rabbinical courts to their 
sources of law. Although the Israeli State was founded by 
secular, European Zionists, Orthodox authorities worked prior 
to the establishment of the state to establish the authority of the 
Rabbinical courts.158 A status quo agreement between the 
European Zionist and Orthodox factions was reached a year 
before the creation of the state regarding the position of Judaism 
in the soon to be state.159 The agreement “gave the Orthodox 
authorities a monopoly on personal status issues” and has led to 
the strength of the Rabbinical courts today.160 The Zionist 
movement, while secular, recognized that “religious tradition 
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‘provided the affective ties of unity needed by the modern nation-
builders.’”161 The Rabbinical courts achieved a major win, further 
guaranteeing their position, with the passing of the Rabbinical 
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953, which 
“recognized the Orthodox religious realm’s monopoly on matters 
of marriage and divorce for Jews.”162 This has had lasting 
impacts on the ability of the Rabbinical courts to withstand 
reform, including attempts by factions of the Knesset to curtail 
the Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction.163 
The most significant change the Sharia courts witnessed 
with the establishment of the State of Israel was the shift from 
operating under a Muslim sovereign and serving a majority 
population, to operating under a secular Jewish sovereign and 
serving a minority population. This shift especially impacted the 
role of the qadi (Islamic court judge). Historically, jurisprudential 
development and reform (ijtihad) fell to specially qualified jurists 
(mujtahid) that the head of state designated.164 With the creation 
of the State of Israel, this task fell to the qadis.165 For many years, 
however, the qadis on the Israeli Sharia courts were ill equipped 
to fulfill this task due to issues with appointment process, as with 
the establishment of the Israeli State, and consequently, the 
Muslim population lost control over the appointment of qadis.166 
Per the 1961 Qadi Law, “Qadis are salaried state 
officials . . . nominated by the President of the State of Israel.”167 
As a result, many qadis in Israel lacked the necessary 
legal education and experience for the position.168 This led to 
narrow opinions from the Sharia courts that could not meet the 
needs of the Muslim population facing questions of modernity 
and norms of the state and provide for constitutionally protected 
rights.169 However, the Qadi Law of 2002 now requires that qadis 
“have a significant religious education in Sharia or Islamic 
studies, or have considerable experience in a legal profession.”170 
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This has led to qadis expanding their traditionally strictly 
judicial role to include the role of legal scholarship and 
development. The primary means by which they have done this 
is through the Sharia Court of Appeals, which issues legal 
circulars.171 As discussed more extensively below, this has led to 
a court better able to “adjust the legal norm to the changing 
circumstances of the time.”172 
The Sharia Court of Israel has accomplished most of this 
legal adaptation via its use of classical Sunni Islamic legal 
scholarship. This scholarship is divided into four denominations 
or legal schools of thought (madhab). Traditionally, Muslim 
judges issue opinions based on the legal reasoning and 
conclusions of a specific school. In the Israeli Sharia courts, 
however, the judges’ source of law is much broader. They rely on 
Ottoman family law (the codification of primarily one of the 
schools of thought),173 draw upon all four Sunni schools of thought 
(takhayyur)174 and look to modern Islamic Laws from Muslim 
majority states (particularly those in the Middle East).175 
Importantly, they apply the binding opinions of the Sharia 
Appeals court, which did not exist historically. The application of 
binding appellate decisions is notably also used by the American 
Jewish judicial bodies and the English Islamic judicial bodies. 
Likewise, the MAT also approaches classical Sunni Islamic legal 
schools of thought with the methodology of takhayyur, which 
allows judges to draw on opinions from any of the four schools.176 
2. Evolution of RJBs in England 
RJBs in England have also experienced a historical 
evolution of narrowing jurisdiction. Prior to the Reformation, 
church courts in England enjoyed extensive jurisdiction over what 
would be considered today as “secular contract law.”177 These 
church courts serve as the historical backdrop to England’s 
modern religious arbitration.178 In pre-modern England, “religious 
authorities frequently provided routes to justice that were an 
alternative to the state courts.”179 While these “religious courts 
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exercised compulsory jurisdiction,” they overlapped with modern 
religious arbitration “in that they competed directly with civil 
courts.”180 The parallel nature of the church courts was such that 
in the fourteenth century, “church courts had adopted the practice 
of hearing appeals from the common-law courts.”181 
This jurisdiction was “in direct competition with the royal 
courts” and can be understood as a circumstance of “quasi-arbitral 
jurisdiction in contract matters.”182 Within the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, the jurisdiction of church courts included 
“matrimonial, probate, tithe, and defamation cases.”183 This 
jurisdiction was enjoyed via “the doctrine of fidei laesio, or breach 
of faith.”184 Such that the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not based 
on failure to perform, but rather, that “he had breached his oath 
to perform.”185 Within the sixteenth century, the common law 
courts also “found ways of exercising jurisdiction over these 
disputes.”186 In a similar vein, from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-
seventeenth century, the church heard an explosion of slander 
cases and tithe related cases (as the entire population was 
required to pay tithes).187 The jurisdiction of the church courts 
were severely curtailed in the English Revolution, but similar to 
the Sharia courts in the late-Ottoman Empire, were able to 
maintain jurisdiction over “matrimonial and probate disputes 
until 1857.”188 With the English Revolution, the church lost 
jurisdiction over “all that is now considered ‘secular.’”189 
This historical legacy continues to be negotiated in the 
modern era via the Arbitration Act of 1996190 and non-binding 
mediation. While the Arbitration Act is not specifically intended 
for use by religious bodies, nothing in the Act prohibits its use 
by RJBs (although the Act limits the kinds of disputes to mostly 
commercial disputes).191 Much like the Federal Arbitration Act 
in the United States, the act “limits the conditions under which 
either party may appeal . . . appeals are allowed on grounds that 
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the procedures followed were unfair or misleading.”192 As will be 
discussed below, however, the use of the Arbitration Act by RJBs 
especially Islamic RJBs, has led to calls for legislative action to 
limit Islamic arbitration and mediation in England. 
3. Evolution of RJBs in the United States 
Although the U.S. historical experience with religious 
courts departs from the English experience in that the United 
States never had a state religion, it shares a similar background 
with regard to the historical role of church courts in the colonial 
period. Within the earlier American experience of religious courts, 
there was “competition between state- and church-sponsored 
dispute resolution,” as well as areas in which no “civil alternatives” 
existed to the “church dispute resolution.”193 Both countries’ 
religious courts were also likely impacted by Enlightenment ideals 
regarding freedom of thought and religion on religious courts.194 
Within the American colonial experience, a variety of 
churches were established with different states having their own 
churches.195 This laid the groundwork for a culture of valuing a 
diversity of religious choices. While a significant portion of 
Israel’s early founders were Orthodox Jews seeking to escape the 
Enlightenment, America’s founders were seeking to preserve the 
Enlightenment ideals of freedom of thought and religion.196 Of 
particular significance to the American experience was the 
passing of the First Amendment in 1789, “which prevented an 
established church from reaching the same position in national 
American life as it had in Britain.”197 The variety of churches also 
led to judicial diversity in the colonial period.198 
During the colonial period, churches were frequently the 
only courts available and a culture of utilizing alternative 
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dispute resolution developed.199 For instance, in 1635 a Boston 
community issued an ordinance requiring that “no congregation 
members could litigate unless there had been a prior effort at 
arbitration.”200 Religious belief and convenience supported this 
culture of turning towards alternative dispute resolution. 
According to Nicholas Walter: 
The civil courts functioned as a “back-up” when the civil power was 
needed—for example, to arrest persons and attach property. The 
parallel jurisdiction of the civil and church courts is a feature of 
modern-day arbitration, and it is not surprising that the other 
characteristics that we often associate with modern arbitration—
speed, informality and inexpensiveness—were present in religious 
arbitration before American independence.201 
Religious arbitration within the American Jewish community 
has taken on a number of different forms, including the pre-
World War I Kehillah tribunals and the creation of different 
arbitral bodies for the Ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox, and 
Conservative communities.202 Of particular significance to the 
lasting success of Jewish arbitration was the “passage of the 
Municipal Court Act of 1915, which made their judgments 
legally binding.”203 Other jurisdictions passed similar laws in the 
early 20th century, making Jewish arbitration viable in multiple 
jurisdictions.204 The historic and contemporary popularity of 
religious arbitration within minority and off shoot religious 
communities reflects the religious requirements of those 
communities to comply with religious law. As will be discussed 
in Part III, these RJBs have taken several steps to ensure 
compliance with both religious and civil law.205 
The current form of Jewish judicial bodies arises out of 
the historical experience of these courts in the United States. 
While they have existed in the United States for over a hundred 
years, it is only recently that these courts have found “their 
footing in the American legal system.”206 Some of the earlier 
difficulty is likely attributable to anti-Semitic sentiments in the 
American public at large and as a result, within the American 
judiciary. During the early period of Rabbinical courts in the 
United States, “secular courts were uncomfortable upholding 
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and enforcing arbitral decisions” of Jewish courts, viewing these 
decisions as entailing “foreign, inaccessible substantive and 
procedural law.”207 The situation today is dramatically different. 
This historical experience has translated into the modern 
use of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) by RJBs, such as the 
BDA. Like the U.K.’s Arbitration Act of 1996, the FAA is also 
centered on contract and “makes it clear that agreements to 
arbitrate are valid” with a few limitations.208 The FAA reflects 
“the law’s long-held preference for courts honoring private 
agreements between parties.”209 
Also similar to the UK’s arbitration act, an arbitration 
award may be vacated “where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means.”210 Generally, the FAA does 
not permit a substantive review of arbitration awards.211 Case law 
has developed, however, such that a court may “vacate arbitral 
rulings that are contrary to public policy, and some courts have 
gone further to hold that an award may be vacated if its substance 
amounts to manifest disregard for the law.”212 While courts rarely 
vacate arbitration awards on these grounds, RJBs demonstrate 
an awareness of the procedural requirements necessary to have 
their decisions upheld.213 
In all three countries, the historical relationship to 
religious courts has resulted in an environment which values 
legal pluralism with the option to resolve disputes before RJBs. 
Because of the historical development of secular law in each 
country, the RJBs have limited jurisdiction and compete with civil 
courts. The current political climate in these countries, however, 
reflects a growing unease with RJBs. 
B. Hostile Political Environments 
Opposition to religious courts in all three jurisdictions has 
centered on gender politics; in particular, opposition has coalesced 
around the perceived threat of Islamic and Jewish courts to 
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women’s equal rights. These politics have focused on divorce 
rights in both faiths, as in both traditional interpretations of 
Jewish and Islamic law women do not share the same rights as 
men to unilateral divorce.214 Furthermore, the vast majority of 
issues that RJBs address deal with family law, especially related 
to divorce, i.e. custody, distribution of property, etc.215 
The political reaction to Islamic arbitration and mediation 
has been more tempered in England than the United States. In 
England, political action has mostly taken the form of calls for 
legislative limitations on arbitration and mediation. For instance, 
in 2012, “the House of Lords gave a second reading to the 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality Bill).”216 While the 
bill is facially neutral, comments on the bill indicate that the 
primary concern is the perceived unequal treatment of women in 
Islamic arbitration and mediation, especially with regard to 
divorce.217 Lord Carlile of Berriew expressed similar concerns and 
“suggested that the House might usefully consider whether 
England and Wales should adopt at least some of the provisions 
of the Ontario Family Statute Law Amendment Act 2009,” which 
banned all religious arbitration in reaction to the Ontario Sharia 
Debate discussed earlier in this article.218 
Were such an amendment passed, it would significantly 
limit the ability of RJBs to issue rulings based on religious law. 
Such an amendment would require that “any decision made by a 
third party in arbitration or other proceedings ha[s] no legal effect 
unless exclusively in accordance” with the laws of the 
jurisdiction.219 The Bishop of Manchester raised some concern 
about the impact such legislation would have on Jewish courts.220 
The debate on the bill represents lingering political concerns about 
Muslim judicial policies in particular. While the Government 
determined that existing law largely addressed the concerns of the 
proposed amendment and therefore was unnecessary, concerns 
about the role of Islamic law in England continue.221 
In the United States, political action has frequently taken 
the form of outright “Sharia bans,” which have resulted in state 
legislatures passing legislation banning the application of Islamic 
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law in “their state legislatures and courts.”222 The first such 
legislation originated in Oklahoma in November 2010 with its 
“popularly-ratified ‘Save our State’ Amendment to the Oklahoma 
Constitution.”223 This legislation has been prompted by “imagined 
legal worries” and a desire to “head[ ]  off a problem before it 
started.”224 Although a federal court “found that the Sharia law 
provisions of the amendment are unconstitutional” for its specific 
targeting of one religion, more than a dozen states have passed 
an alternative version directed at “foreign law” to accomplish the 
desired effect of banning Islamic law.225 
This legislation has prompted concern within the Jewish 
community about the potential impact it may have on religious 
arbitration. The passing of this legislation led Jewish organizations, 
such as the Agudath and the Orthodox Union, to join with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, among others, as signatories to 
letters sent to state legislatures to encourage them to reject anti-
Sharia legislation.226 One such letter reads: 
The impact of this legislation goes well beyond prohibiting religious 
tribunal resolution of monetary or ministerial disputes . . . . It would 
apparently prohibit the courts from looking to key documents of church, 
synagogue or mosque governance—religious law—to resolve disputes 
about the ownership of a house of worship, selection and discipline of 
ministers, and church governance.227 
While the full impact of such legislation on religious arbitration 
remains to be seen, there is little indication that sentiments 
towards Muslims or Islamic law in the United States have 
warmed since their passing. In 2017, anti-Muslim and anti-
Sharia movements continued to gain momentum as hate crimes 
and “anti-sharia” rallies increased.228 
In Israel, political concerns about RJBs have also 
centered on women’s rights in both Judaism and Islam. This has 
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resulted in both legislative and judicial action. The Israeli 
Supreme Court, both as the highest appellate court and as the 
High Court of Justice (HCJ),229 has issued rulings curtailing the 
jurisdiction of the Rabbinical and Sharia courts.230 As described 
earlier, the Knesset has previously taken steps to limit the 
jurisdiction of the religious courts through the narrowing of 
existing jurisdiction and the creation of concurrent legislation.231 
In addition to the historic role of Orthodox Judaism to the 
cultural identity of Israel, political positioning of the Orthodox 
subculture in Israel has also led to unwillingness in the 
Rabbinical courts to accommodate the secular legal norms of the 
state. Israel is a parliamentary democracy in which coalition 
governments have long been a defining feature.232 Due to these 
coalitions, the Orthodox Jewish community has often wielded 
significant political weight.233 Religious parties have become a 
critical element to almost all coalitions and “[a]s a result, every 
Government since 1959 has explicitly committed itself, in the 
formal coalition agreement which established the Government, 
to maintaining the religious status quo” agreement, which 
preserves the Rabbinical courts.234 The subculture of Orthodox 
Judaism in Israel is centered on Halachah and disputes often 
emerge due to contrary legal interpretations.235 One component 
of this subculture is the religious Zionists who have aligned 
themselves with the National Religious Party (NRP).236 Another 
component is the “Torah Sages, the rabbis who have earned 
great prestige through their ability to interpret Halachah,” most 
of whom are not aligned with the NRP.237 The Torah sages 
suspect the religious Zionist leadership “of surrendering 
Halachic principles for ‘mere’ political advantage.”238 To combat 
these suspicions, the religious Zionists “are quite rigid on 
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matters squarely within traditional Judaic concerns—for 
example, marriage and divorce.”239 
Furthermore, religious coercion regarding the 
appointment of judges to the Rabbinical courts remains a major 
political issue in Israel. For instance, in late December 2017, the 
governing coalition of Likud, Shas, and United Torah Judaism 
(major political parties in Israel) reached an agreement that 
their representative to appoint Rabbinical court judges would 
come from one of the two ultra-Orthodox parties.240 Despite 
campaign promises that he would fight religious coercion, Yesh 
Atid’s leader, Yair Lapid, also supported the appointment “of an 
ultra-Orthodox lawmaker to the committee that appoints judges 
to Israel’s rabbinical courts.”241 In doing so, he “forced two [of his 
own] party[’s]” representatives to step down from candidacy.242 
Through these kinds of political alliances, the ultra-Orthodox 
and Orthodox factions of Israel have maintained control over the 
appointment of Rabbinical court judges and perpetuate rigid 
interpretations of religious law in the Rabbinical courts. 
C. Civil Court Pressure 
RJBs exist within larger secular judicial frameworks that 
require that they meet certain procedural rules and uphold civil 
rights, which require RJBs to accommodate these requirements 
if they want their decisions upheld. RJBs that represent 
religious minority populations exist more precariously within 
the society and possess less autonomy in the enforcement of 
their awards. Due to the political power of the Orthodox Jewish 
lawmakers in Israel, the Rabbinical courts in Israel (which 
uphold Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law), can essentially 
disregard the Supreme Court of Israel. 
1. The Rabbinical Courts’ Defiance of Judicial Review 
The Israeli Supreme Court acting as the High Court of 
Justice affirmed its supremacy and jurisdiction over the 
Rabbinical courts in two high-profile cases, the Lev case and the 
Bavli case.243 Prior to these cases, “[t]he assumption was that the 
Rabbinical courts would . . . apply religious law to each and  
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every matter which arose during the course of the hearing, 
including matters which exceeded the scope of the issues of 
personal status.”244 Read together, these rulings “lead to the 
application of the general civil law to the Rabbinical courts in all 
matters, save in matters of personal status.”245 But the 
Rabbinical courts met the Bavli decision with open hostility. In 
response, they convened emergency meetings “on how to handle 
the new ruling . . . and religious leaders stated that rabbinical 
courts would not abide by it.”246 In the line of cases following the 
decision, the Rabbinical courts have refused to apply it. The 
Rabbinical courts display a confidence and independence absent 
from RJBs representing minority populations. 
2. The Sharia Courts’ Responsiveness to Judicial 
Review 
The Supreme Court of Israel has asserted its jurisdiction 
over the Sharia courts in multiple cases. Unlike in the case of 
the Rabbinical courts, the Supreme Court has not imposed the 
application of civil law on the Sharia courts, but rather, has 
narrowed the Sharia courts’ jurisdiction.247 In a custody case 
before the Sharia Court of Appeals involving a Muslim father 
and a Christian mother, the court ruled that as under Islamic 
Law, religious identity of a minor is determined patrilineally; 
the child was a Muslim and Islamic Law required custody be 
granted to the Muslim parent.248 The Supreme Court, however, 
ruled that in custody matters involving parents of different 
religions, “the Sharia courts lack jurisdiction.”249 
Similarly, in a case regarding paternity of an illegitimate 
child, a civil district court rejected the case “in limine on ground 
of lack of competence, since paternity and maintenance are 
matters of personal status and fell, at the time, within the sole 
jurisdiction of the Sharia court.”250 The case was then appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the child was 
“entitled to benefit from ‘civil paternity’ that is, biological, 
natural paternity.”251 The Court framed its ruling in terms of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, stating: 
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Where the [Sharia] Court cannot and will not exercise its jurisdiction, 
and consequently denies, even if indirectly, rights that a Moslem has 
earned according to the law of the land, namely the civil law, the 
Order-in-Council should not be interpreted as giving sole jurisdiction 
to the religious Court, while denying the civil systems jurisdiction.252 
The Court, in framing its decision took care to recognize that the 
Court was not compelling the Sharia court to apply “laws that 
are against its religious doctrine.”253 
The Sharia courts responded to this narrowing of their 
jurisdiction via internal reform, especially within the Sharia 
Court of Appeals. The Sharia Court of Appeals, in an initiative led 
by the President of the Court of Appeals, issued a series of 
circulars leading to reform in the Sharia courts’ judgments.254 This 
response to the Supreme Court’s judicial review shows sincere 
concern over further erosion to their jurisdiction. 
3. The Arbitral RJBs’ Reliance on Civil Court 
Enforcement 
RJBs in England and the United States mostly operate 
as arbitral bodies and depend on civil courts to enforce their 
decisions. All other RJBs in England and the United States act 
as informal mediation and advisory bodies that issue non-
binding opinions. The BDA is the most prominent Jewish RJB 
in the United States and the MAT is the most prominent Islamic 
RJB in England.255 Because they operate as arbitral bodies that 
rely upon civil courts to enforce their decisions, both the BDA 
and the MAT have deliberately modeled their procedural rules 
after the procedural rules of the civil courts.256 Because they 
operate as arbitral bodies, they rely upon civil courts to enforce 
their decisions. Although distinct rules of procedure exist in 
Jewish and Islamic law, the BDA and MAT utilize innovative 
methods to ensure that their arbitration procedures meet the 
requirements of their countries’ respective arbitration acts and 
the requirements of their respective religious law.257 
The MAT and the BDA demonstrate an explicit 
consciousness of the secular legal system in which they operate. 
On the MAT website, it differentiates itself from other Islamic 
RJBs in England by highlighting its ability to “adher[e] to the 
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English Legal System whilst still preserving . . . practices of 
Islamic Sacred Law.”258 Likewise, the BDA in the introduction to 
its procedural rules states: “The Beth Din of America adjudicates 
disputes in a manner consistent with secular law requirements 
for binding arbitration so that the resolution will be enforceable 
in the civil courts of the United States of America, and the 
various states therein.”259 Failure to comply with the legally 
mandated procedural standards of their respective arbitration 
acts “can serve as grounds for vacating the arbitration award.”260 
Arbitral RJBs in the United States have focused their 
concern on meeting procedural requirements of the FAA due to 
the current standard of review for arbitration decisions. Per the 
FAA, civil courts do not differentiate between secular, 
commercial arbitration and religious arbitration, simply 
treating them all as arbitration.261 Therefore, enforcement of 
awards from religious arbitration “avoids any excessive 
entanglement with religious doctrine because the courts, when 
enforcing arbitration awards, are instructed not to investigate 
the merits of the dispute between the parties.”262 In recent years, 
the Supreme Court has expanded the “deference and autonomy 
granted to arbitration tribunals,”263 although it has maintained 
that “a substantive waiver of federal civil rights [in arbitration 
agreements] will not be upheld.”264 
Civil courts may vacate arbitration awards that “seriously 
conflict with the law,”265 either in the form of “a substantive 
waiver of civil rights,” a violation of “public policy” 266 or a 
demonstration of “manifest disregard of the law.”267 A violation of  
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“public policy” within an arbitration award may also result in a 
civil court vacating the arbitration award. In these instances, 
courts will generally not enforce the arbitration award on the 
basis “that the waiver of substantive rights is not merely a matter 
of private contract, but implicates broader societal interests that 
ought not be permitted to be abrogated through private 
agreements.”268 Some American civil courts have extended this 
principle to vacate arbitration decisions “that conflict with 
broader, but not strictly legal policy concerns.”269 
Thus far, the BDA and the MAT approach to crafting 
arbitration procedural rules that meet all the procedural 
requirements of their respective arbitration acts has led to 
success. Civil courts in the United States “have never overturned 
a BDA-issued arbitration award” and the MAT has met similar 
success in England.270 
D. Litigants’ Social Expectations 
The expectations of religious practitioners also impact 
the willingness of RJBs to accommodate secular norms. Both the 
BDA and the MAT indicate sensitivity to the desires of their 
litigants. The MAT states: “where appropriate, that members of 
the Tribunal have responsibility for ensuring this [is] in the 
interests of the parties to the proceedings and in the wider public 
interest.”271 Likewise, the BDA rules allow for disputes where 
the parties explicitly adopt a “choice of law” provision and 
“accept such a choice of law clause as providing the rules of 
decision governing the decision of the panel to the fullest extent 
permitted by Jewish law.”272 
Religious laity living in these countries are aware of their 
rights under secular laws and, in some instances, come to expect 
preservation of those rights by RJBs. This is particularly true 
regarding women’s rights.273 Both Jewish and Muslim women 
have initiated movements calling for their equal treatment 
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under religious law.274 These women often seek change within 
religious law itself and call upon RJBs to support them in ruling 
in more equitable ways. These expectations are especially 
important for the BDA and the MAT, as the majority of cases 
before them are divorce cases, which have particular 
implications for women’s rights in Jewish and Islamic law.275 
As in the Ontario Sharia Debate, Muslim women have 
often led the charge for more equal treatment under religious 
law. In her research on Muslim women, Cassandra Blachin, 
Chair of the Muslim Women’s Network, found that Muslim 
women “want greater financial autonomy and security, a fairer 
division of property reflecting their contribution to the family’s 
finances, freedom of mobility and equality in decision-making, a 
monogamous relationship, and, should mutual understanding 
break down, then equal access to divorce.”276 
Some legal scholars have also misinterpreted Muslim 
women’s interest in preserving their civil rights. For instance, in 
England, at least one study has shown that “less than half” of 
Muslim women who married “a partner domiciled in England 
had registered their marriages according to civil law, meaning 
that the largest group of women in [the] sample were in effect 
unmarried according to English family law.”277 Other legal 
scholars have interpreted this data to show that British Muslims 
“intentionally choose to avoid using state law,” but studies show 
that the majority of “women had in fact expected their religious 
marriages to be registered in accordance with the Marriage 
Acts,” and thus they intended to enjoy the protections of civil 
marriage.278 In those instances where these women then seek a 
divorce, they are shocked to learn that they do not have the 
protections of civil marriage.279 
At the same time, motivations for utilizing religious 
arbitration and mediation often derive from a religious 
conviction that a religious divorce is necessary to remarry, and 
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that civil divorce alone is insufficient. In order to obtain a 
religious divorce, Muslim women often must petition an Islamic 
judicial body to rule in her favor,280 as under classical 
interpretations of Islamic law, a Muslim woman cannot 
unilaterally declare herself divorced (as a Muslim man can). A 
similar challenge exists for Orthodox Jewish women living in 
secular societies, as the husband’s consent is required for a 
Jewish divorce (gett); civil divorces are not enough to release 
them to remarry within their religious practice.281 As well 
documented in the book, “The Wed-Locked Agunot: Orthodox 
Jewish Women Chained to Dead Marriages,” Orthodox Jewish 
women have been at the forefront of the movement to rectify the 
plight of Jewish women stuck in marriages (agunah/agunot) 
because of the disparities in divorce rights in Orthodox 
interpretations of Jewish law.282 
Central to the agunah question is that “[a]ccording to 
[Jewish law], a Jewish marriage comes to an end by the husband 
giving his wife a get [a written bill of divorce with specific 
procedural requirements], a process only he can carry out.”283 A 
woman becomes an agunah when for all intents and purposes 
she is divorced but has yet to receive a get.284 Failure to receive 
a get prohibits her from religiously remarrying, but no such 
prohibition exists for her husband.285 If she remarries without 
the get, under Jewish law she will be viewed as committing 
adultery and any children resulting from such a marriage will 
have the religious legal designation of mamzerim (illegitimate) 
(which carries certain legal repercussions).286 
Susan Aranoff and Rivka Haut led the effort to challenge 
the Orthodox Jewish courts to end the plight of the agunot. In 
particular, they publicized the inaction of the courts to help these 
women and brought greater awareness to the Orthodox Jewish 
community of the courts’ injustice. Aranoff and Haut document 
how for some of the agunot the ill treatment of the Rabbinical 
courts led to a crisis of faith and serious consideration of leaving 
the Orthodox faith.287 This led to members in the community  
 280 Lee Ann Bambach, “That Ye Judge with Justice” Faith-Based Arbitration 
by Muslims in an American Context 147 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory 
University) (on file with author). 
 281 ARANOFF & HAUT, supra note 274, at 9. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Adena Berkowitz, The Prisoners of Divorce, LILITH, Winter 1987–1988, at 1 
(italicization added). 
 284 BROYDE, supra note 5, at 248–49. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Benjamin Steiner, The Lieberman Clause Revisited, 69 AM. JEWISH 
ARCHIVES J. 41, 44 (2017). 
 287 ARANOFF & HAUT, supra note 274, at 84. 
784 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
pressuring the Rabbinical courts to better address the legal needs 
of the agunot.288 Although the issue persists today, Conservative 
and Orthodox Jewish courts have taken steps to help resolve the 
problem, as discussed in greater detail below. 
In Israel, Muslim women have also led the initiative for 
legal reform to address inequities under divorce law related to 
maintenance. In the 1990s, Arab Muslim feminists joined forces 
with Palestinian and non-Palestinian organizations to form a 
“Working Group for Equality in Personal Status Issues.”289 The 
stated goal of the group “was to ‘combat discrimination against 
Arab women in the area of personal status, and change social 
norms by promoting significant changes in attitudes and behavior 
toward Arab women and their personal status issues.’”290 With the 
passing of the Family Courts law in the Knesset (which created 
parallel jurisdiction in parallel family law courts),291 the Working 
Group launched a successful initiative for an amendment which 
granted “Muslim and Christian women the option of recourse in 
maintenance suits—as well as in all other matters of personal 
status, except for marriage and divorce—to the new family 
courts.”292 As discussed below,293 the Sharia courts reacted to these 
calls for reform and limits on their jurisdiction by initiating an 
internal reform of their own.294 
In contrast, the Israeli Rabbinical courts have largely, 
successfully resisted calls for reform. As a matter of law, the 
Rabbinical courts must adhere to the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Israel, yet the political clout of Orthodox and Ultra-
Orthodox Jews in Israel allows for the Rabbinical courts to 
essentially disregard the Supreme Court decisions.295 Although 
the majority of Jewish Israelis are not Orthodox, the Orthodox 
control of the courts remains due to the political power of 
Orthodox Jews and the role of Orthodox Judaism in national 
identity.296 Scholars have noted that: 
The term Jewish state denotes far more to Israelis than the fact that 
a majority of its population is Jewish. Ninety-three percent of the 
Jewish population believes that Israel ought to be a Jewish State. Now 
Jewish state undoubtedly means different things to different people, 
but to the vast majority of the population it means a state which is 
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predominantly Jewish (83 percent), which lives in accordance with the 
values of Judaism (64 percent), and whose public image is in accord 
with the Jewish tradition (62 percent). Seventy-seven percent feel 
that there ought to be some relationship between religion and state in 
Israel. In other words, Jewishness contains religious overtones for the 
vast majority of Israeli Jews, and they seek a reflection of this content 
in the conduct of the state.297 
This national identity strengthens the position of the Rabbinical 
courts, as they are aware of the cultural affiliations of the 
majority of the population. This translates into a reliance on the 
courts for religious legal matters, such as divorce, that exists 
even when civil options are available. 
This is not to say that Jewish groups have not called for 
reform. For instance, Israel now recognizes secular marriages 
performed abroad, although divorce proceedings for those 
marriages must still occur before the Rabbinical courts for 
Jewish litigants.298 Furthermore, historically when Jewish 
courts were serving minority populations, they “frequently had 
to change the Law to meet novel conditions.”299 Those calling for 
reform often “invoke the memory of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook 
(1865–1935).”300 During the Mandate period, Rabbi Kook 
“facilitated cooperation between Orthodox and other 
Jews . . . by, among other things, reinterpreting Halachah to 
deal with the exigencies of contemporary life.”301 For instance, 
the successful passing of the Sanction Law in 1995 was “[a] 
major step forward with regard to the agunah problem” created 
by get refusal.302 Under the Sanctions Law, rabbinical court 
judges may “issue sanctions and a variety of restrictive orders 
upon a recalcitrant spouse.” While historically the community 
would “use indirect pressure to influence a husband to issue a 
bill of divorce,” the legislation has transferred that power to the 
courts which may “withhold certain benefits of the husband.”303 
Unfortunately, despite the ability to do so, Rabbinical courts 
rarely utilize the Sanction Law and get refusal remains a 
problem for Jewish women in Israel.304 
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The “internal dynamics of the Orthodox subculture in 
Israel” does not lend itself to accommodating the “exigencies of 
contemporary life” created by the secular norms of the state.305 
In part, this is due to the lack of a “rabbinical seminary offering 
a university-oriented program of studies,” as exist in all other 
Western countries with sizeable Jewish populations.306 
Furthermore, a cultural attitude exists within Israel’s Orthodox 
population to not “change the Halachic norms governing 
marriage and divorce”307 and “for them the applicability of 
religious law is not conditioned upon the secular lawmaker’s 
will.”308 After the Israeli Supreme Court required the Rabbinical 
courts to follow civil law, the Rabbinical court judges met and 
formally rejected the decision on the grounds “that they consider 
themselves bound only by the religious law and not by state law 
or by precedents set by the SC.”309 
This does not suggest that Halachic reform in the areas of 
divorce and marriage law is inherently impossible, but rather that 
the Rabbinical courts in Israel refuse to reform religious law at the 
dictates of a secular state. Historical evidence exists of rabbinical 
authorities reforming divorce and marriage law based on the needs 
of the populace: “[F]or a period of approximately four hundred 
years (650–1050), Rabbinic authorities in several Mediterranean 
countries interpreted Halachah so as to permit either party to 
obtain a divorce against the other’s will.”310 Furthermore, as 
discussed in Part III, Jewish courts in contemporary jurisdictions 
such as the United States are developing solutions to accommodate 
the exigencies of contemporary life.311 
E. Institutional Parallels 
The article thus far has portrayed RJBs serving minority 
religious communities as responsive to external forces, including 
pressure from litigants and civil courts. Although this account is a 
new view of RJBs, the understanding of judicial tribunals as 
responsive to forces beyond merely the law on the books resonates 
with work in both constitutional theory and public administration. 
First, consider the resonance between RJB accommodation and 
theories of popular constitutionalism. Despite obvious differences 
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between civil courts and RJBs, distinct similarities exist in the 
dynamic between the Article III courts and the public and RJBs 
and the populations they serve. As such, popular constitutionalism 
echoes some of the explanations of why RJBs respond to popular 
opinion. They face similar consequences if they are unresponsive to 
popular opinion. Furthermore, in both instances, a tension exists 
between faithfulness to the original intent of the founding texts and 
responsiveness to the popular desire of the populace. 
RJBs respond to changing values of religious laity by 
reinterpreting the past legal commitments of previous generations 
of scholars and applying these past commitments in new ways or 
at a higher level of generality. According to one theory of popular 
constitutionalism, Article III courts similarly “synthesize new 
values and institutions with the past by reinterpreting the past 
constitutional commitments of previous generations, showing how 
what the political branches are doing is actually faithful both to the 
Constitution and to the past.”312 One way in which Jewish and 
Islamic RJBs demonstrate this approach is in their continued 
commitment to regarding marriage as a contractual relationship, 
while concurrently reinterpreting standard clauses of the marriage 
contract to include protection for women in the event of divorce (as 
discussed in more detail in Part III).313 Additionally, Article III 
“courts may describe past commitments in new ways or at a 
higher level of generality, often drawing on the entire history of 
readings of the Constitution by political and judicial actors.”314 
This parallels Islamic RJBs’ use of takhayyur, the methodology 
that allows judges to draw on opinions from any of the four 
classical schools of Islamic legal theory.315 
Popular constitutionalism suggests that RJBs may face 
consequences if they are unresponsive to the values and desires of 
religious laity. Potential consequences include: “First, it may 
render a judicial decision futile . . . . Second, outrage might make a 
judicial decision perverse, in the sense that it might produce 
consequences that are the opposite of those intended by the 
Court.”316 Additionally, there is the view that “judges should attend 
to public outrage because of the particular risks to the judiciary 
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itself. Lacking electoral legitimacy or a police force, judges are 
highly dependent on public acceptance of their authority. If the 
public is outraged, judicial authority might well be jeopardized.”317 
RJBs’ authority depends on the religious laity utilizing 
them and accepting their judgment. Despite religious 
commitments, religious laity may be prone to seek redress in civil 
courts, instead of an RJB, if their civil rights might be lost by going 
to an RJB. RJBs have very weak to non-existent enforcement 
mechanisms, relying on religious commitment as a primary means 
of ensuring their judgments are upheld.318 This weak enforcement 
can lead to RJBs’ decisions being rendered futile. If RJBs contradict 
an individual’s sense of justice or beliefs about religious law, then 
they may not comply with the ruling, may not recommend the RJB 
to others, and may not utilize the RJB in the future. 
Outrage may also have eschatological implications that 
render an RJB decision perverse. Since the RJBs aim to promote 
the application of and adherence to religious law, outrage to a 
decision may result in the opposite effect. Namely, because these 
RJBs are operating in democratic societies that protect freedom of 
religion and speech, religious laity may choose to leave their 
religions. Within the Islamic context, apostasy has grave 
eschatological impact, such that Islamic RJBs may be concerned 
with the moral consequences of being implicated in causing 
apostasy.319 Thus, beyond competition from civil-courts and the 
possibility of forum shopping, the consequences facing RJBs 
include potentially contributing to apostasy. 
RJBs concerns regarding their continued existence also 
resonate with the force at play in Wilson’s descriptions of 
“organizational maintenance.” An organization’s maintenance “is 
threatened by any number of forces which we might describe 
generally as ‘strain.’ They include the withdrawal of valued 
members . . . [and] the challenge of a rival organization . . . .”320 
Organizational maintenance requires an active membership, which 
for RJBs means a religious population that views the RJB as 
legitimate and chooses to regularly utilize them. 
Membership maintenance directly relates to an 
organization’s ability to accommodate its environment—“[A]ll 
organizations seek some form of accommodation with their 
environment, because the costs of sustaining indefinitely a combat-
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oriented organization are generally too high to be borne by the 
members.”321 Members of an RJB may bear personal costs if the 
larger society views the RJB as out of sync with or even a threat to 
its environment. For instance, within the context of Islamic RJBs 
in England and the United States, if the larger society considers an 
Islamic RJB at odds with secular norms, political organizations 
may target it and the popular media may portray it as violating 
women’s rights or threatening national security. In those 
instances, social and political consequences may accompany any 
affiliation with the RJB for individuals involved with the RJB. 
RJBs, like political organizations, “are highly averse to 
risk and thus avoid active rivalry except under special 
circumstances.”322 This risk aversion leads to the “maintenance 
strategy [of] develop[ing] autonomy—that is, a distinctive area 
of competence, a clearly demarcated and exclusively served 
clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a 
function, service, goal, or cause.”323 RJBs cannot completely 
avoid competition with civil courts. They minimize the 
competition, however, by creating procedural norms that mirror 
the civil courts (thus, reducing the potential attractiveness of the 
civil courts) and carving out undisputed competence and 
jurisdiction over the application of religious law. 
Finally, “[o]rganizations do not recruit and motivate 
members from a homogenous population of equally interested, or 
uninterested, prospects; rather, they offer inducements to persons 
who differ.”324 While it may be easy to imagine the population that 
utilizes an RJB as homogenous, in reality the population may differ 
in significant ways, including religiosity, cultural and linguistic 
background, age, and citizenship. Therefore, to maintain 
membership, RJBs behave in ways that accommodate the broad 
normative expectations of the diverse populations they serve. 
Although RJBs are outside courts and public administration 
bodies that popular constitutionalism and Wilson’s political 
organization theory address, these strands of thought mirror some 
of the forces at play with RJBs. In particular, RJBs face similar 
concerns to Article III courts regarding the backlash they may face 
from unpopular opinions. They also share motivations with political 
organizations regarding self-preservation. In short, RJBs share 
motivations and behaviors of other courts and political organizations 
in secular democratic societies. 
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III. RJBS’ ACCOMMODATIONS: GENDER AND PROCEDURE 
This Part substantiates the article’s core claim: that 
religious judicial bodies accommodate the secular norms of the 
nation in which they operate. It gathers several examples from 
Islamic and Jewish RJBs serving minority populations in Israel, 
the United States, and England. These RJBs have adjusted their 
application of pre-marital agreements and divorce, arbitration 
procedure, commercial law, and jurisdiction, all in an apparent 
effort to gain legitimacy in the eyes of secular courts (which may 
enforce their judgments) and litigants (who could otherwise 
select a different forum). 
The primary areas of accommodation have been in 
divorce law and civil procedure. In the first instance, this is due 
to two factors. First, the majority of cases before these RJBs are 
divorce cases.325 Second, women’s rights—especially equalizing 
the right to divorce—has become a rallying cry both for religious 
women and for political forces opposed to RJBs.326 Conformity to 
rules of civil procedure for arbitration-based RJBs has also been 
a locus of accommodation, as “[f]ailure to comply with such 
standards can serve as grounds for vacating [an] arbitration 
award.”327 I contrast these examples with the example of 
Rabbinical courts in Israel, which serve a majority population 
and has adopted “an ideology under which any change or 
alternation undermines the foundations of religion.”328 
The U.S. and England: Gender Equality 
Given that divorce cases comprise the majority of the cases 
before the MAT and BDA, both RJBs have sought to align their 
respective religious laws with the secular norms of substantive 
justice of the state via the preemptive use of prenuptial 
agreements and standardized marriage contracts to alleviate 
inequalities in divorce proceedings. 
In England, the Muslim Institute, Britain’s foremost Muslim 
think-tank,329 drafted and has advocated for the use of its standard 
marriage contract. The contract includes provisions such as: 
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1) Removing the requirement for a “marriage guardian” (wali) for 
the bride, who, as an adult, can make up her own mind about whom 
to marry 
2) Enabling the wife to initiate divorce and retain all her financial 
rights agreed in the marriage contract 
3) Forbidding polygamy whether formally or informally in the UK 
or abroad 
4) Encouraging mosques to register to perform marriages330 
The BDA has also looked at contractual solutions to address 
inequalities in Jewish divorce law. The BDA has developed and 
advocated for the use of a prenuptial agreement (the Prenup) to 
address the unequal treatment of Jewish women under 
Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.331 In September 2015, 
the Rabbinical Council of America issued a resolution stating 
that its “members must utilize, in any wedding at which he is 
the officiant (mesader kiddushin), in addition to a ketubah, a 
rabbinically-sanctioned prenuptial agreement, where available, 
that aids in our community’s efforts to ensure the timely and 
unconditional issuance of a get.”332 The reasoning the BDA 
provides for the need for the Prenup—from their website 
theprenup.org—is that in modern society bataei din “frequently 
lack the authority” to ensure that the “get is not improperly 
withheld.”333 Therefore, the Prenup, which is entered into prior 
to marriage, stipulates that in the event of divorce “the beit din 
will have the proper authority to ensure that the get is not used 
as a bargaining chip.”334 
The recommended use of “the Prenup” resulted from a 
long debate within the American Jewish community about how 
to best address the issue of get refusal. It addresses the issue by 
requiring, in the event of divorce, that the couple agree to 
arbitrate the divorce before the BDA. 
While the BDA is the most prominent Jewish judicial 
body in the United States, it is but one of many such bodies.335 
Distinct differences exist between Orthodox Jewish judicial 
bodies (of which the BDA is one) and Conservative Jewish 
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judicial bodies. The differences between them in large part exist 
due to their respective perspectives on “the extent to which 
Jewish law could be bent to meet the ‘progressive standards of 
American life.’”336 The get refusal problem is one of the 
fundamental ways in which this difference has been drawn. 
How to address the get refusal problem within the United 
States became a major debate between Orthodox and Conservative 
Jewish scholars.337 During this period, the Jewish Theological 
Seminary (JTS)—the locus for Conservative Jewish scholarship 
and home of Conservative Judaism’s judicial body, the JTS Beth 
Din—crafted a solution known as the “Lieberman Clause.”338 
Under the Lieberman Clause, the JTS Beth Din added an addenda 
to the ketuba (the Jewish marriage contract), in which the parties 
to the contract, the marrying couple, “agreed to recognize the Bet 
Din of JTS as having the authority to counsel them to summon 
either partner before it.”339 Today, the Orthodox BDA resolves this 
issue by requiring the use of its pre-nuptial agreement.340 
The U.S. and England: Secular Procedural Justice 
The BDA displays a distinct consciousness of the secular 
legal environment in which it operates and its reliance on civil 
courts to enforce its decisions. It has constructed its judicial 
bodies around six principles in order to “gain the respect of secular 
courts.”341 While the BDA existed since 1960, the transformation 
of the BDA into a respected arbitration venue began in 1996.342 
The BDA board of directors deliberately “worked with the BDA’s 
rabbinic leaders to craft an arbitration process that secular courts 
are comfortable upholding.”343 Rather than merely focusing the 
“technical legal requirements” to adhere to American arbitration 
law, the BDA took a multi-pronged approach to gain the 
confidence of American secular courts.344 
The approach did not entail “substantive alternations of 
Jewish law not permitted by the halakhic system itself,”345 but 
rather existing options within the interpretation of Jewish law. 
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The “permissible but innovative approaches” allow the BDA to 
“successfully navigate[ ]  the complex relationship between secular 
and religious law in the United States,” providing religious 
adherents a judicial form “consonant with both Jewish and 
American law.”346 Michael Broyde, a member of the BDA and 
Emory Law School professor, has identified six main pillars as key 
elements to the success of the BDA. He describes these six main 
pillars as follows: (1) the development of formal procedural rules, 
ensuring due process for all parties; (2) the establishment of an 
appellate process, promoting accountability and transparency; (3) 
respect for the ultimate legal authority of the secular state; (4) the 
use of “customs” in commercial cases; (5) “dual-system fluency” of 
arbitrators in both the American legal system and their respective 
religious law; and 6) an “active role” in representing their religious 
communities’ interests to the larger society.347 
Within these pillars, the BDA exhibits a distinct 
conscientiousness of the larger, secular legal environment in 
which it operates. This conscientiousness takes two forms: taking 
into consideration the expectations of secular courts enforcing 
their decisions and, importantly, taking into consideration the 
expectations of disputants living within the secular environment. 
The BDA displays awareness that disputants’ “sense of fairness 
and justice” is informed by both their religious identity and their 
membership as citizens of a secular state.348 
Disputants’ expectations also come into consideration 
regarding issues of custom and commercial practice. While 
Jewish judges know the requirements of religious law, the 
community may not and may have “already adopted the 
commercial law norms of the general society in which it lives and 
works and [have] fully integrated secular law norms with the 
Jewish law.”349 Within Jewish law this does not necessarily mean 
that Jewish law will be contravened to meet the expectations of 
disputants. Rather, within the realm of commercial matters, two 
elements allow for this accommodation: (1) “any condition that 
is agreed upon with respect to monetary matters is valid, and (2) 
customs established among merchants acquire Jewish law 
validity, provided that the practices stipulated or commonly 
undertaken are not otherwise ritually prohibited.”350 The 
introduction to the BDA’s rules of procedure recognizes that the 
BDA “provides a forum where adherents of Jewish law can seek 
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to have their disputes resolved in a manner consistent with the 
rules of Jewish law (halacha) and with the recognition that 
many individuals conduct commercial transactions in 
accordance with the commercial standards of the secular 
society.”351 To achieve this, the BDA rule Section 3(e) states that 
the BDA will accept “common commercial practices . . . to the 
fullest extent permitted by Jewish Law.”352 
The BDA also accepts the jurisdictional limits imposed by 
the secular state. For instance, recognizing that a religious 
divorce will never also serve as a civil divorce, the BDA has taken 
measures to ensure that divorcing couples also receive a civil 
divorce. To this end, the BDA hinges the effect of the religious 
divorce on the attainment of civil divorce. The BDA Jewish 
divorce documents state that each party is “free to marry provided 
that s/he is also civilly divorced.”353 Rather than renouncing civil 
divorce as illegitimate, and advocating for Jewish marriage and 
divorce alone, the BDA recognizes the limits on its jurisdictions 
and the importance of civil marriage in regards to the protection 
of civil rights for Jews living in under secular, civil law. 
The MAT in England followed in the footsteps of the BDA 
to deliberately create “innovative processes . . . ensur[ing] that 
its arbitrations would conform to the formal requirements of the 
Arbitration Act, garner the respect of British courts, and make 
judges more comfortable enforcing its rulings.”354 Also like the 
BDA, the MAT has used innovation within the religious legal 
tradition, particularly in regards to procedure, to craft “an 
arbitration process that gives British Muslims the opportunity 
for effective dispute resolution services consistent with both 
British and Islamic law.”355 In doing so, the MAT views itself “as 
building on Islamic law’s normative adjudicatory framework in 
light of contemporary views about what procedures best protect 
litigants and ensure just outcomes.”356 
A 2009–2011 Cardiff University study found that like 
their American counterparts, “religious courts [in England] 
strongly encourage the parties to obtain a civil divorce before they 
engage in religious proceedings, recognising that the law of the 
state takes priority and that it is in no one’s interest to have a 
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‘limping marriage.’”357 This respect and prioritization of the laws 
of the state also extends into the asserted jurisdiction of Jewish 
and Islamic judicial bodies in the United States and England. 
What is absent from any of these RJBs are attempts to 
expand their jurisdiction. Within the English and American 
context, what we do not see are any indications that these RJBs 
desire to expand their jurisdiction beyond their current 
limitations. There are no efforts, for example, to expand their 
scope to include criminal or tort law. Jewish and Muslim RJBs 
in both the informal context of unenforceable ADR and the more 
formal context of enforceable arbitration have accepted that, 
though their respective religious legal systems apply to a much 
broader range of contexts, they will limit themselves to the 
matters of commercial and family law permitted under civil law. 
The Islamic RJBs in Israel: Gender Equality and Civil 
Courts 
The Israeli Sharia courts in recent decades have also had 
to address the issue of limitations on their jurisdiction. They 
have responded to the threats of the civil courts to the erosion of 
their jurisdiction with sincere concern around the potential loss 
of Muslims to the civil courts and a desire to accommodate the 
needs of the entire Muslim population.358 The response of the 
Israeli Sharia court to the attempts of the secular courts to erode 
its jurisdiction can be traced to two causes: (1) the minority 
identity of the population it serves; and (2) its sources of law. 
The Sharia courts serve the Muslim population of Israel, which 
is Arab and “largely [has] an Arab-nationalist consciousness.”359 
For this Muslim population, recourse to civil courts reflects 
issues related to political identity. Although the qadis (judges) 
are state appointed, the Sharia courts represent a degree of legal 
autonomy, otherwise not enjoyed by the Arab Muslim 
population.360 Furthermore, recourse via legislative action is also 
complicated due to political and religious identity. Petitioning 
the Knesset for legislative reform is tantamount to inviting the 
Israeli State to further interfere in the narrow autonomy of the 
Arab Muslim population. 
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Furthermore, from a religious-legal perspective, 
statutory codification of Islamic Law is only “appropriate for 
independent Muslim countries.”361 Without a Muslim sovereign 
or independent Muslim legislative authority, the only means for 
reform is via the Sharia Court of Appeal.362 Israel’s Jewish 
population does not face the same political or religious concerns 
and has civil and legislative options for reform as the majority 
Jewish population. 
In the area of divorce, the Sharia courts have carried out 
a series of reforms via the Sharia Court of Appeals. These 
appeals have “led to an improvement of women’s status with 
relation to divorce,” resulting in dissolution of a marriage 
becoming “an option for both husband and wife.”363 These 
reforms have in large part derived from a shift in the 
relationship of the Sharia Court to Islamic Law. Rather than 
strictly adhering to traditional interpretations of Islamic Law, 
the Justices on the Sharia Court of Appeals look to it for 
“inspiration” and derive their rulings from a variety of sources, 
such as the laws of regional Muslim majority countries like 
Egypt and Jordan.364 Furthermore, the Qadis do not restrain 
themselves to a single school for their sources of inspiration. 
While they restrain themselves to the realm of Sunni Islam, they 
may draw on multiple schools, such as Maliki and Hanafi 
jurisprudence, in an opinion. Specifically, the Islamic Law the 
Sharia Court of Appeals draws upon is “an interaction between 
jurist’s law written by fuqaha, statute law inspired by these 
fuqaha and the legal contributions of the qadis.”365 By broadly 
drawing on a wide range of legal sources that may all broadly 
fall under Islamic law, the qadis may select the legal opinion or 
reasoning that best meets the specific needs of a case. 
The Sharia courts, however, have only engaged in the 
process of reforming their understanding of Islamic Law for the past 
two decades. This change can be traced back to the appointment of 
three qadis to the Sharia Court of Appeals: Ahmad Natur, Faruq 
Zu’bi and Zaki Midlag.366 Under their guidance the Court “initiated 
a policy which attempted to balance women’s rights on the one hand 
and meet the requirements of the Islamic movement on the other.”367 
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They have “introduced reforms in the fields of maintenance, child 
custody, inheritance, and procedure.”368 They have also “adopted 
facets of Israeli legislation, such as the principle of judging in the 
interest of the child,”369 as a means to better reflect the sensibilities 
of the populations they serve and to prophylactically avoid further 
erosion of their jurisdiction by the civil courts. They have 
accomplished this reform via creatively interpreting traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence, “reaffirming its power over the regional 
Shari’ah Courts,” and “enhancing its symbolic image.”370 
Qadi Natur, former President of the Israeli Sharia Court 
of Appeals, played a particularly important role in these reforms. 
The Qadi Law of 2002 has increased the perceived legitimacy of 
qadis as arbiters of Islamic Law.371 The Qadi Law granted the 
president of the Sharia Court “jurisdiction to make the procedures 
faster and more efficient, to adopt temporary procedures, and to 
disqualify qadis,” similar to the efficiency found in arbitration 
systems.372 Qadi Natur served as President of the Court of 
Appeals for two decades until 2013.373 It was under his tenure that 
the Sharia Court of Appeals began its “process of judicial 
activism . . . which continues until this day.”374 This judicial 
activism has relied heavily on the creation of a hierarchy of law 
(which previously did not exist in Islamic Law) and the issuance 
of pseudo-legislation in the form of circulars.375 
The Jewish RJBs in Israel: Resistance 
The Sharia and Rabbinical courts have responded to 
threats to their jurisdiction from the Israeli Supreme Court in 
very different ways. The Rabbinical courts have mostly refused to 
reform religious law to meet the needs and pressures of the entire 
Jewish population and thus alleviate motivations for Israeli Jews 
to petition civil courts for relief. The Rabbinical court claims to 
“protect its autonomy against external interference of the secular 
authority,” but ignores the increasing expansion of civil law into 
the area of family law.376 Furthermore, the Rabbinical court has 
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been accused of “covering up its religious failure to deal with the 
social and cultural reality of Israel.”377 
As noted earlier, in response to an Israeli Supreme Court 
case limiting the Rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction, the Rabbinical 
courts judges met and formally declared that they were rejecting 
the decision and would not comply with it on the grounds “that they 
consider themselves bound only by the religious law and not by 
state law or by precedents set by the [Supreme Court].”378 Although 
the secular, civil courts in Israel view the Rabbinical courts as 
subject to the laws of the state and ruling under state authority, 
religious judges believe that their application of religious law “is 
not conditioned upon the secular lawmaker’s will.”379 
The Jewish population has mostly responded to the 
recalcitrant position of the Rabbinical courts through legislative 
action380 and selection of civil options (such as marriage aboard).381 
Today, the majority of Jewish Israelis are not Orthodox382 and the 
Rabbinical courts do not necessarily reflect their non-Orthodox 
understanding of religion. For instance, the Rabbinical courts do 
not accommodate Conservative or Reform interpretations of 
Jewish Law commonly found in the United States. The Orthodox 
men that sit on the Rabbinical courts tend to “apply Jewish law in 
its most traditional form” and “adhere to the principle that women 
should be confined to the private sphere.”383 
The Rabbinical courts’ response to threats to their 
jurisdiction has recently taken the form of asserting jurisdiction 
over Israeli Jews who seek to avoid their authority. For instance, 
in a 2010 divorce, the Rabbinical courts assumed jurisdiction over 
a couple who married “in Cyprus because, as secular Jews, they 
wished to avoid religious requirements.”384 Rather than applying 
the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling requiring the Rabbinical courts 
to provide a quick dissolution of the marriage, the Rabbinical court 
disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling and required a full get.385 
The problem of get refusal remains a serious one for 
Jewish women in Israel. Despite the intervention of secular 
courts in this area, the intervention of the secular courts “has  
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 378 Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 214. 
 379 Englard, supra note 24, at 46. 
 380 See Gallala-Arndt, supra note 156, at 204 (“On 28 October 2013 the Israeli 
parliament (the Knesset) voted in a law allowing couples who want to marry to choose 
the rabbi who will perform their marriage.”). 
 381 See Triger, supra note 4, at 6. 
 382 Pnina Lahav, Israel’s Rosit the Riveter: Between Secular Law and Jewish 
Law, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1063, 1064–65 (2013). 
 383 Id. at 1065. 
 384 Triger, supra note 4, at 7. 
 385 Id. 
2019] RELIGIOUS COURTS IN SECULAR JURISDICTIONS 799 
led to a stalemate.”386 In response to the attempts of the secular 
courts to erode their jurisdiction, the Rabbinical courts have 
developed “an ideology under which any change or alteration 
undermines the foundations of religion.”387 At the same time, the 
availability for recourse to the civil courts reduces “the pressure 
that could otherwise be brought upon” the courts to reform their 
interpretations and interpret Jewish law in a way that “would 
show awareness of the exigencies of life . . . sensitivity to the 
needs of the hour and flexibility in the face of the conditions of 
the time and place.”388 
CONCLUSION 
Muslim and Jewish judicial bodies serving minority 
populations demonstrate a willingness to accommodate the 
secular norms of substantive and procedural justice of the state. 
As other scholars have noted, when adopting facets of secular 
law, these religious courts rarely acknowledge that they are 
borrowing the dominant legal system, but rather they undertake 
a process of internal contextualization, such that the principles 
are established as existing within the religion itself.389 Through 
this process of internalization, the courts meet the procedural 
requirements necessary for enforcement by the state and meet 
the expectations of litigants necessary to maintain legitimacy. 
Conversely, the example of the Rabbinical courts in 
Israel shows rigid adherence to religious law as unchanging and 
unaccommodating. Since the courts shifted from their position 
of serving a minority population under the Ottoman Empire to 
serving a majority population with the inception of the State of 
Israel, the Rabbinical court “has been less flexible and less 
innovative in its Halachic interpretation.”390 
This suggests that perhaps assumptions about Islamic 
courts in majority-Muslim countries as “archaic, unchanging 
institutions”391 have more to do with the political environments in 
which they operate and the majoritarian populations they serve, 
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than an inherent flaw in Islamic law itself. To fully answer this 
query, additional research on the historical and contemporary 
operation of Jewish and Islamic courts is necessary. 
Based on the findings of this article, future avenues of 
inquiry might examine the factors and mechanisms that 
promote or deter majority serving RJBs’ responsiveness to 
popular opinion and the secular norms of the state in a variety 
of democratic countries. For instance, a fuller examination 
might comparatively examine the Rabbinical courts of Israel, 
Hindu courts in India, and Sharia courts in Indonesia focusing 
particularly on the role of religion to national identity and the 
use of political coalitions to protect RJBs. Such an inquiry might 
also include a close review of the published opinions of these 
RJBs to determine their legal reasoning in instances where they 
demonstrate a willingness to accommodate popular opinion or 
the secular norms of the state. 
This article’s focus has been on conceiving of religious 
judicial bodies more broadly to include both state-run and 
arbitration bodies and orienting the inquiry on RJBs from the 
prevailing perspective of whether democratic legal systems 
should accommodate religious legal pluralism to whether RJBs 
accommodate litigants and their environment. By looking at 
RJBs that serve majority and minority populations, this article 
suggests, that at the very least, the cultural and political 
position of an RJB influences its willingness to consider context 
and environment in the application of religious law. 
